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In this study, the researcher tested two theoretical models of justice in the context
of child protection proceedings. Participants read a case file describing a hypothetical
child neglect case. The file included the court petition, the caseworker’s court report, a
summary of the protective custody hearing, and the judge’s final order. Within the case
file, the researcher manipulated four variables: procedural treatment, interpersonal
treatment, severity of child neglect, and assigned role (judge or parent). Results of
confirmatory factor analyses suggested that a four-factor model of justice judgments best
fit the data. Consistent with the organizational justice approach (Colquitt, 2001) the four
latent justice factors were: procedural, distributive, interpersonal, and informational.
Distributive justice had the strongest relationship to measured justice outcomes,
significantly predicting decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, and predicted legal
compliance. The results did not support the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader,
2003) in that perceptions of social identity did not mediate the relationships between
procedural justice judgments and predicted legal compliance. Both severity of neglect
and assigned decision-making role weakly moderated the relationships between justice
judgments and outcomes. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for
justice theory and child protection practice.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Since the late 1970s, psychologists have studied the effects of decision-making
procedures on decision recipients. Starting with the seminal work of Thibaut & Walker
(1975), we have known that perceptions of procedures can have just as much an impact
on reactions to decisions as the decisions themselves. In fact, subsequent research has
consistently demonstrated that procedural justice has a stronger impact on attitudes and
behaviors than distributive justice in many contexts (e.g., Bettencourt, Brown, &
MacKenzie, 2005; Tyler, 1984, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher,
1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985).
Research on procedural justice can be divided into two overlapping categories,
one aimed at uncovering the antecedents of justice and the other aimed at uncovering the
consequences (Ambrose, 2002). Research on the antecedents of justice has been largely
theoretical (e.g., Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Bies & Moag, 1986; Bies, 2001; Blader &
Tyler, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005; Henle,
2005; Johnson, Selenta, & Lord, 2006); the purpose has been to understand how people
come about deciding whether something is fair and what aspects of the procedure people
rely on in making those determinations. In statistical terms, this body of research has
largely been directed toward identifying a measurement model of justice judgments. In
contrast, research on the consequences of justice has blended application and theory (e.g.,
Cropanzano, Howes, Grandy, & Toth, 1997; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002;
Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000; Roch & Shanock, 2006; Tyler & Blader,
2003). Researchers have explored attitudinal and behavioral consequences of fairness
perceptions in a variety of contexts, from consumer to employment to legal. In statistical
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terms, this body of research has been primarily directed toward identifying a structural
model of the outcomes of justice.
Until recently, these two bodies of literature have progressed largely independent
of each other. However, in recent years, researchers have started moving towards creating
theoretical frameworks that include both the antecedents and consequences of justice
perceptions. Two approaches stand out. On the one hand, organizational psychologists
have posited that that there are three (or four, depending on the researcher) distinct types
of justice—procedural, distributive, and interactional (which can be divided into
interpersonal and informational)—each reflecting different kinds of concerns or
information, and thus, linked to different behavioral and attitudinal consequences (Bies,
2001, 2005; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt &
Shaw, 2005).
On the other hand, legal psychologists distinguish between only two kinds of
justice—procedural and distributive (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, &
Cohn, 2002; Heuer, Penrod, & Kattan, 2007; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader,
2003).1 In addition, the latest theoretical model that has come from this approach, called
the group engagement model, does not predict the same kinds of differential outcomes.
Instead, this model posits that both procedural and distributive justice indirectly predict
justice outcomes via their influence on people’s sense of identity. Greater perceptions of
justice give people a more positive sense of social identity, which makes them more
1

At this point, I should acknowledge that the distinction between “organizational
psychologist” and “legal psychologist” is not a firm one. For example, Tyler, one of the
most prominent psycholegal justice researchers, has frequently collaborated with
organizational justice researchers and tested his theories in the organizational context,
(e.g., Bies & Tyler, 1993; Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Blader, 2009).
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likely to have positive attitudes about a decision and engage in group-relevant behavior.
Unlike the organizational justice approach, the group engagement model goes further to
identify underlying mechanisms or attitudes that link justice judgments to outcomes (see
Blader & Tyler, 2005).
This dissertation tested these two theoretical models in an experimental design. I
manipulated four variables: procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity of
child neglect, and participant role. The first two manipulations were designed to test the
core hypotheses derived from the two theoretical approaches. The second two were
designed to test moderator effects. The introduction to the dissertation begins with a
literature review and ends with a detailed description of the research questions and
hypotheses tested herein. The methods, data analysis, and discussion sections follow, in
that order.
The Organizational Model of Justice
Colquitt (2001) illustrated what I call the “organizational model of justice”
(OMJ), but it should be noted that it was built on a synthesis of years of organizational
justice research by a large number of researchers. In fact, Colquitt (2001) takes
ownership of the measurement portion of the model, and the associated organizational
justice measure that is now widely used (e.g., Chiaburu, 2007; Siers, 2007; Wu, Neubert,
& Yi, 2007). However, he treats the fact that the four proposed justice constructs have
differential outcomes as merely a validation of the validity of those constructs, rather than
a component of a formal theory, as such. Nonetheless, taken together, this work and
Colquitt’s subsequent writings (2001; Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Colquitt, Greenberg,
& Scott, 2005; Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005;
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Scott, Colquitt, & Zapata-Phelan, 2007) provide a cohesive framework for understanding
the antecedents and consequences of justice.
Measurement Component
The core proposition of the organizational model of justice is that people evaluate
four distinct types of justice (measurement component), and each of these judgments is
associated with distinct outcomes (structural component; Figure 1.1 on p. 33). The four
types of justice are distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. Procedural
justice refers to evaluations of the formal decision-making procedure, like whether the
process was conducted in an unbiased manner. Distributive justice refers to the fairness
of the decision-making outcome, or the decision itself. Both interpersonal and
informational justice refer to evaluations of the decision-maker. Interpersonal justice
judgments reflect evaluations of the decision-maker’s sensitivity, like whether the
decision-maker was respectful. Informational justice judgments reflect evaluations of the
decision-maker’s justifications for the decision, like whether the decision-maker
explained the decision and the explanation was reasonable.
Many of these ideas are not new to the field of justice research. In particular, the
distinction between procedural and distributive justice has been present in the literature
since Thibaut and Walker (1975) (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Leventhal, 1980; Tyler
& Folger, 1980). The literature has defined distributive justice in the same terms since
then (see, e.g., Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 2001; Folger & Konovsky,
1989; Moorman, 1991). However, the major difference is in how organizational
psychologists define the other three justice constructs. It was not until the late 1980s that
organizational justice researchers began to consider that their definition of “procedural

5
justice” might be confounding distinct types of judgments. In 1986, Bies and Moag
proposed that “procedural justice,” as defined up until that point, actually consists of two
distinct constructs—procedural and interactional justice—with procedural justice
referring to evaluations of the decision-making process and interactional justice referring
to evaluations of the decision-maker. Today, this distinction has been widely adopted by
organizational justice researchers (e.g., Bernerth, Armenakis, Field, & Walker, 2007; De
Cremer, van Dijke, & Bos, 2007; Flaherty & Moss, 2007; Forret & Love, 2008;
Klendauer & Deller, 2009), and is the predominant measurement model within the
organizational justice field.
Colquitt’s (2001; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005) contribution to the field is this further
distinction between interpersonal and informational justice. In essence, Colquitt (2001)
argues that the construct of interactional justice remains too broad, and that people’s
evaluations of their interpersonal and informational treatment are independent and lead to
differential outcomes. Generally, his work (e.g., Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt & Shaw, 2005),
as well as the work of others provides mixed support for this distinction (e.g., Kernan &
Hanges, 2002; Siers, 2007; Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008; Wenzel, 2006; Wu,
Neubert, & Yi, 2007). The empirical support for the OMJ will be discussed in more
detail later.
Structural Component
The structural component of the OMJ is simply the prediction that each of the
four distinct types of justice predict distinct types of outcomes. Specifically, distributive
justice is more influential on self-relevant evaluations, like decision satisfaction and
approval. In contrast, procedural justice should be more influential on system- or
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institution-related outcomes, like organizational commitment and compliance with the
decision. Because interpersonal justice is an evaluation of the decision-maker’s
sensitivity, it ought to be more influential on outcomes like evaluation of the decisionmaker as a leader. Finally, informational justice should be more influential on outcomes
related to one’s group identity, like collective esteem. This last hypothesis is derived
from the argument that informational justice conveys a sense of respect from the group,
which Colquitt derived from the research of Tyler and colleagues (Tyler & Lind, 1992;
Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996).
It is worth noting that while the model posits that each of the four types of justice
predicts specific outcomes, it is silent on whether one type of justice might also influence
the outcomes primarily associated with the other types of justice. In other words, while
interpersonal justice might most strongly predict leader evaluation, that is not to say that
informational justice does not also have some influence on leader evaluation. In fact,
given how interrelated justice judgments and outcomes generally are, it would be
exceptional if it were not the case that multiple judgments predicted the same outcome.
Thus, my interpretation of the model is that it predicts the relative strength of judgmentoutcome relationships, rather than absolute or singular relationships.
There is support for this interpretation in the literature. First, the justice contructs
themselves appear to be highly correlated. Colquitt (2001) found significant correlations
between all four justice constructs, ranging from .17 for the correlation between
distributive and interpersonal justice and .64 for the relationship interpersonal and
informational justice. In their meta-analysis, Cohen-Charash & Spector (2001) found
correlations between distributive, procedural, and interactional justice ranging from .46 to
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.55. Second, the research investigating differential outcomes has not consistently
produced clean results supporting the absolute relationship hypothesis. For example,
Colquitt (2001) found that, in addition to interpersonal justice, procedural justice also
predicted leader evaluation. Similarly, Roch and Shanock (2006) found that both
informational and procedural justice predicted organizational support, with procedural
justice being a relatively stronger predictor.
Support for the Model
As mentioned earlier, there is robust support for the distinction between
procedural and interactional justice. In fact, two meta-analyses were recently published,
both providing evidence of the conceptual distinction. Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001)
included 190 samples and over 64,000 individual participants in their meta-analysis.
They found the perceptions of all three justice constructs to be significantly correlated.
Interactional and procedural justice were equivalently correlated in laboratory
experiments, r = .57, and in field studies, r = .58. The authors concluded from these
correlations that procedural and interactional justice were related, but distinct, constructs.
The authors found additional evidence for the distinction between the justice
constructs in their differential relationships with outcomes. Specifically, procedural
justice was more strongly related to institution-relevant outcomes, like organizational
support. Distributive justice was more strongly related to evaluations of the outcome, like
pay satisfaction. These findings provided some support for the structural model of the
OMJ. However, the authors did not have enough data to test the specific hypotheses
regarding the relative strength of the relationships between procedural and interactional

8
justice and their associated outcomes. Therefore, overall, the meta-analysis provided only
mild support for this particular component of the organizational model.
In the second meta-analysis, which Colquitt and colleagues (Colquitt, Conlon,
Wesson, Porter, and Ng, 2001) published the same year that Colquitt published his
refinement of the OMJ, the authors tested some of the relationships in that theory. Unlike
Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001), Colquitt et al. (2001) analyzed the distinction
between the four justice constructs proposed in the organizational model—procedural,
distributive, interpersonal, and information. Colquitt et al. (2001) first studied the
correlations among the justice constructs. The authors found support for the notion that
there are four distinct types of justice. Specifically, although all four justice judgments
were significantly correlated, the correlations were not so high as to conclude that they
are tapping the same construct. The correlations ranged from r = .38 for the relationship
between distributive and informational justice and r = .66 for interpersonal and
informational justice. Note that this latter correlation is quite high. The authors concluded
that it still supports their proposal that informational and interpersonal justice are distinct
constructs. However, one could easily argue that this correlation is high enough to favor
combining them into the broader construct of interactional justice, which is the more
traditional organizational approach.
Colquitt and colleagues (2001) also evaluated whether justice judgments
differentially predicted decision outcomes and found mixed support. Consistent with the
OMJ, distributive justice more strongly related to outcome satisfaction than the other
justice constructs. Also consistent with the model, procedural justice more strongly
related to organizational commitment and performance at work than the other types of
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justice. However, support for the model broke down with the predictions for interpersonal
and informational justice. The organizational model predicts that interpersonal justice
will more strongly relate to leader evaluation. The results of Colquitt et al.’s (2001) metaanalysis did not support this hypothesis. Instead, informational justice was the strongest
predictor of leader evaluation when researchers measured the construct on a system, or
organizational, level. When researchers measured leader evaluation on an individual
level, with reference to a specific leader, then interpersonal and informational justice
were more equivalently predictive. These findings, again, suggested that the distinction
between interpersonal and interactional justice is not as strong as Colquitt (2001) has
proposed.
Consistent with the two meta-analyses, the vast body of literature almost
universally supports the distinction between procedural and interactional justice (e.g.,
Bernerth, Armenakis, Field, & Walker, 2007; Chory, 2007; De Cremer, van Dijke, &
Bos, 2007; Flaherty & Moss, 2007; Forret & Love, 2008; Klendauer & Deller, 2009;
Luo, 2007), both in terms of scale or measurement validity and predictive validity.
As for the distinction between informational and interpersonal justice, the research
support is sparser and more equivocal. In Colquitt’s (2001) original publication of the
model, he presented the results of three studies, all of which supported the distinction. In
his first study, Colquitt (2001) tested and validated his measurement model using
confirmatory factor analysis with two different samples, a field sample of employees and
a university sample. In the second and third studies, he tested the structural model and
found general support for the model’s differential outcome predictions. The second study
confirmed all four relationships between the justice constructs and their individual
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outcomes, although it should be noted that, in addition to interpersonal justice, procedural
justice also predicted leader evaluation. The third study also supported all four predicted
relationships.
In addition, other researchers have investigated this more nuanced four-factor
approach and found some support (e.g., Kernan & Hanges, 2002; Siers, 2007; Skarlicki,
van Jaarsveld, & Walker, 2008; Wenzel, 2006; Wu, Neubert, & Yi, 2007). Moreover,
many contemporary organizational justice researchers have adopted Colquitt’s (2001)
measure, which is evidence that the measurement model, at least, has been implicitly
accepted as valid (e.g., Siers, 2007; Wu, Neubert, & Yi, 2007). Nonetheless, despite its
implicit acceptance, consistent or robust empirical support for the OMJ is lacking,
especially when it comes to the distinction between interpersonal and informational
justice. This dissertation was among the first experimental tests of the model.
The Group Engagement Model
The group engagement model is described in full detail in Tyler and Blader
(2003) and reproduced in Figure 1.2 (p. 35). As with the organizational model of justice
(OMJ), the group engagement model (GEM) includes both a measurement and a
structural component. However, compared to the organizational justice model, the GEM
seeks to explain the underlying process whereby positive procedural treatment creates
positive attitudes and behavioral engagement with regard to the decision-making group
and the decision itself. Another key difference is that the OMJ distinguishes between
different kinds of justice outcomes, while the GEM, on the other hand, makes a much
simpler argument with regard to outcomes. Put simply, the GEM posits that procedural
justice will improve group engagement. The GEM is a model of motivation and, as such,
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its strength is in its description of the process. The OMJ is much more a descriptive
model of the strength and relationships between types of justice and types of outcomes.
Measurement Component
Whereas Colquitt (2001) proposes that justice judgments consist of four distinct
categories, Tyler and Blader (2003) argue that there are really only two categories:
procedural and distributive justice. The group engagement model defines distributive
justice in the same terms that Colquitt (2001) uses, focusing on the fairness of the
outcome itself. In contrast, procedural justice is defined more broadly in the GEM than in
the OMJ. In fact, Tyler and Blader’s (2003) measurement model of procedural justice
encompasses the substance of all three of the OMJ’s remaining justice constructs:
procedural, interpersonal, and informational.
While similar substance is in both models, the structure and definition are quite
different. Specifically, Tyler and Blader (2003) propose that procedural justice judgments
are founded on four components, which are detailed in a separate publication (Blader &
Tyler, 2003). According to the model, two functions are central to people’s judgments
about procedural justice: the quality of the decision-making and the quality of the
treatment. Blader and Tyler (2003) argue that decision-making quality provides
information about the outcomes of the decision making process and whether those
outcomes will be fair. In evaluating decision-making quality, people rely on issues like
neutrality and opportunity to participate in the process.
Arguably, decision-making quality is akin to “procedural justice” in
organizational justice research, and treatment quality is akin to “interactional justice.”
However, the components are defined in broader terms in the four-component model than
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in the OMJ, because they take into account two different “procedural sources.”
Procedural source is the second function in Blader and Tyler’s (2003) model. The source
can be either formal or informal. Formal sources are rules and policies of the institution
and reflect the prevailing group norms. Informal sources of procedural information are
the particular authorities enacting the procedure, like a judge or supervisor.
Blader and Tyler (2003, 2005) acknowledge that their model recognizes the
distinction between procedure and treatment so prevalent in organizational research, but
they argue that their model presents a more comprehensive view of interactional justice.
Specifically, organizational justice research tends to define procedural justice in formal
terms (i.e., formal decision-making) and interactional justice in informal terms (i.e.,
informal treatment). The four-component model extends this measurement by allowing
for judgments of formal treatment and informal decision-making, which are excluded in
the narrow conceptualizations of justice in the OMJ.
Structural Component
The structural component of the GEM is more complex than that of the
organizational model of justice. As with Colquitt (2001), Tyler and Blader (2003) draw a
link between justice judgments, on the one hand, and attitudinal and behavioral reactions
on the other. However, that is where the similarities end. Tyler and Blader (2003) argue
that justice judgments, regardless of the type of justice, indirectly affect attitudes and
behaviors through the mediating mechanism of identity judgments, which include pride
in being a member of the organization or institution, respect from the organization or
institution, and identification with the organization or institution. The authors call this
argument the social identity mediation hypothesis (Tyler & Blader, 2003; Blader & Tyler,
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2009). The core idea is this: People are motivated to evaluate justice because it gives
them information about their group identity. To the extent that they perceive increased
fairness, they develop a more positive sense of group identity, which then motivates them
to engage in positive group-related behaviors.
The social identity mediation hypothesis is the gist of the structural component of
the GEM. However, the GEM also describes some more nuanced relationships between
the constructs of interest. Perhaps most importantly, even though both procedural and
distributive justice have the power to indirectly affect behavior, Tyler and Blader (2003)
argue that procedural justice is generally a more powerful motivator than distributive
justice. This argument follows from the assumption that procedural treatment conveys
more information about people’s group identity than distributive treatment. Furthermore,
the model subjugates distributive justice judgments to the role of antecedents of resource
judgments, which reflect people’s understanding of the amount and quality of resources
the group has available to it and the amount and quality of resources the group is willing
to share with that person in particular. Procedural justice and resource judgments directly
influence identity judgments, while distributive justice influences identity only indirectly
through resource judgments, which are, in themselves, hypothesized to be a weaker
influence than is procedural justice.
Despite the relatively weaker position of distributive justice and resource
judgments, Tyler and Blader (2003) make one caveat: the power of procedural treatment
is not as strong when it comes to predicting mandatory group behaviors. The authors
argue that mandatory behaviors, by definition, are directly connected to institutional
sanctions and rewards, which are distributive, resource mechanisms. Therefore, where
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mandatory behaviors, like compliance with legal orders, are concerned, resource
judgments should have both the indirect effect described above and a direct effect on
those behaviors.
With regard to distributive justice, one additional structural detail is worth noting.
In the OMJ, distributive justice directly influences outcome favorability (i.e., decision
satisfaction), and predicts it more strongly than the other three justice judgments. In
contrast, in the GEM, outcome favorability operates at the same level and in conjunction
with distributive justice. Both distributive justice and outcome favorability are two
dimensions of people’s global resource judgments.
A final structural detail deserves attention. Tyler and Blader (2003) make an
additional caveat concerning mandatory behaviors. Specifically, they argue that pride, or
group prestige, motivates people to act with loyalty towards the group. This translates
into pride directly increasing motivation to comply with mandatory behaviors. That is,
pride acts both directly and indirectly through social identity to motivate people to
comply with mandatory group engagement.
Support for the Model
Unlike the organizational model of justice, the GEM has been the subject of very
little systematic research. In introducing the four-component model, Blader and Tyler
(2003) presented data from a series of studies supporting the measurement structure.
However, while a few researchers acknowledge that the model exists (Horvath &
Andrews, 2007; Lipponen, Koivisto, & Olkkonen, 2005), no published study tests the
four-component model of procedural justice, or even adopts it as a measure. In fact, even
the authors themselves have implicitly rejected the four-component model in favor of
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simpler measures of procedural justice in their recent work (e.g., Blader, 2007b; Blader &
Tyler, 2009; Okimoto & Tyler, 2007; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005).
It is unclear why the four-component model has not been as widely tested, yet
alone accepted, as the OMJ. One explanation is that the organizational model is more
parsimonious. The adage that the simplest explanation is often the right one applies to
theory development, and the organizational model of justice is arguably simpler and more
intuitive. Another explanation is that the measurement component of the organizational
model of justice simply has too much momentum as an instrument for researchers to
reject it, even if the alternative is more valid.
Compared to the measurement component, the structural component of the group
engagement model certainly has a stronger empirical foundation. First, it is rooted in
about 15 years of research and theory development. The model has its roots in the group
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) of
procedural justice, both of which were well-supported. The group value model and the
relational model were also based on the hypothesis that procedural justice is important
because of what it communicates to people about their group status and identity.
Consistent with this hypothesis, many researchers adopted one of these models in their
research (e.g., De Cremer, 2003; Murphy-Berman, Cross, & Fondacaro, 1999; van
Prooijen, van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002), and found support for the notion that identity and
status judgments have an important role in the link between procedural justice and
decision outcomes.
For example, Sousa and Vala (2002) surveyed 1100 employees in a Portuguese
insurance company about their perceptions of justice and support for organizational
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change. The researchers explored whether identity judgments (i.e., respect and pride)
mediated the relationships between procedural justice judgments and support for
organizational change. They found partial support for the mediation hypothesis in that,
once pride and respect were factored in, the relationship between procedural justice and
organizational support was partially, but not completely, attenuated.
Tyler, Degoey, and Smith (1996) evaluated the group value model in a series of
four studies in four separate contexts: college students’ conflicts with their parents,
university employees’ conflicts with supervisors, college students’ conflicts with a
faculty or staff member, and people’s attitudes about the United State Supreme Court.
The authors found, consistent with the identity mediation hypothesis, that perceptions of
pride and respect mediated the relationship between procedural justice judgments and
various justice outcomes—compliance with group rules, group commitment, and
voluntary group behavior. The authors did not find complete mediation in every set of
analyses, but they found either partial or full mediation in the majority of analyses.
Second, outside of adopting any of the three models proposed by Tyler and
colleagues, subsequent researchers have still empirically tested the relationships between
procedural justice, identity, and outcomes (Amiot, Terry, & Callan, 2007; Blader, 2007a;
Blader, 2007b; Fuller, Hester, Barnett, Frey, Relyea, Beu, 2006; Gleibs, Mummendey, &
Noack, 2008; Hakonen & Lipponen, 2008; Mayer, Greenbaum, Kuenzi, & Shteynberg,
2009). Although not all studies directly test the mediation hypothesis, generally, the data
support the model. For example, Blader (2007a) conducted two experimental studies in
which he tested the relationships between identification, procedural justice judgments,
and outcomes. In the first study, procedural justice and identification were manipulated,
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while identification and outcome were manipulated in the second study. Taken together,
the results of the studies supported the relationships between identification, procedural
justice, and outcomes predicted by the group engagement model. More specifically,
Blader (2007a) found strong positive relationships between all three constructs: both
positive identification and positive outcome favorability predicted increased perceptions
of procedural justice. The author did not test the social identity mediation component of
the GEM.
Amiot, Terry, and Callan (2007) did test the identity mediation hypothesis in the
context of employee adjustment to organizational merger. In a longitudinal study, the
authors measured employee adjustment and support three months and two years after the
merger. The authors found that identification with the new merged organization fully
mediated the relationship between procedural justice judgments and changes in both job
satisfaction and perceived stress associated with the merger over time. In other words,
procedural justice judgments were associated with increased job satisfaction and
decreased employee stress between Time 1 and Time 2 and these associations were fully
mediated by identification.
To conclude, there is considerable research support for some of the core
relationships proposed in the structural component of the GEM. However, there is
virtually no research even examining the full model, let alone providing empirical
support. This dissertation was among the first to test the group engagement model in full.
Child Protection Proceedings as a Context
A procedural justice framework might be particularly helpful in studying child
protection cases for two primary reasons. First, the psychological concept of procedural
justice maps neatly onto the legal concept of due process, which is the constitutional
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requirement that legal proceedings be conducted in a manner that promotes fair decisionmaking. Second, procedural justice theory has the potential to offer some insight into
parental compliance with court orders and case plans. Specifically, a procedural justice
framework can help to explain one influence on parental compliance and, in turn, identify
ways that judges and caseworkers can act to promote compliance.
Procedural Justice and Due Process
Because child protection proceedings are civil rather than criminal, parents are not
afforded the same procedural protections that criminal defendants have. They do,
however, have certain basic rights under the federal constitution. These rights derive from
the Due Process Clauses of the 5th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, which
require that no state “shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law” (14th Amendment). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that parents have
an inherent liberty interest in the care and custody of their children (Meyer v. ebraska,
1923; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 1925). In Troxel v. Granville (2000), the Supreme
Court stated that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children
is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests” (p. 65). The existence of this
constitutional protection means that the government has limited rights to intervene into
matters related to child-rearing. With regard to child custody, parents cannot have their
rights to the care and custody of their children terminated without being proven unfit or
proven to have abandoned their children (Stanley v. Illinois, 1972).
In the abstract, then, the U.S. Constitution provides strong protections for parental
rights. In practice, this constitutional protection has formed the foundation for the
extension of a host of procedural safeguards to parents in child protection cases.
Specifically, parents generally have a constitutional right to notice of any petition filed
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and a right to a hearing on the merits of the petition, including the right to cross-examine
witnesses and present evidence (Jones, 2006). Parents also have the right to testify on
their own behalf.
Federal legislation has also provided some rights to parents related to due process.
For example, Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, which was modified with the passage
of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA, 1997), gives parents the right to
contribute to the development of their case plan (Badeau, Gesiriech, Haralambie,
Donnelly, & Duquette, 2005). The same section of the Social Security Act gives parents
the right to an expedited hearing when the state places their children into temporary
custody via an ex parte order, meaning that there was no hearing on the merits prior to
removal (Baduea et al., 2005).
Beyond these basic rights derived from the federal constitution, most states have
expanded parents’ due process rights through either state constitutions or state law. For
example, the federal constitution does not provide parents in child protection hearings an
absolute right to counsel (Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 1981). Nevertheless, most
states do provide parents the right to an attorney in child protection proceedings
(Donnelly & Haralambie, 2005). In fact, most states offer protections far beyond the
minimum requirements of the Due Process Clause (Jones, 2006). Appellate court
interpretations of state constitutions, as well as state legislative code, have extended these
rights.
For example, in Nebraska, parents have a right to counsel starting at the
adjudication hearing (Constantakos, 2006), although many districts provide attorneys
even at the initial appearance. Also in Nebraska, judges must inform parents of their
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rights at their initial appearance (In re Interest of R.W., 1990; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43279.01, 2008). In addition to the right to an attorney, Nebraskan parents have the right to
prompt notice of temporary custody and a prompt detention hearing. They also have the
right to an explanation of the nature of the proceeding and the potential dispositions and
consequences of those dispositions. Furthermore, the state guarantees the right to
confront witnesses, the right to testify and compel their own witnesses, the right to a
speedy adjudication, and the right to appeal and obtain a record of the proceedings for the
purposes of the appeal (Neb Rev Stat § 43-279.01, 2008). While some of these rights are
also provided under federal law, they are all codified in the state juvenile code. In
addition, inherent in the requirement that state officers must explain these rights to
parents is the corollary that parents must understand these rights (In re Interest of R.W.,
1990). Generally, judges ask parents if they understand what they have been told and
seek to clarify any misunderstandings as they arise (Constantakos, 2006).
Due process is a cornerstone of involvement in the legal system because it is
necessary for a fair and impartial hearing. In this way, due process protections are
“procedural safeguards,” because they protect parties from potential impropriety or
inequity in the legal system. When one thinks of due process in these terms, it is clear
why a procedural justice framework is so important. As discussed earlier, “procedural
justice” refers to judgments about the fairness of a particular legal decision-making
procedure, a child protection hearing in this case. When due process is present, we can
assume that participants will perceive greater procedural justice (Koh, 2004).
In the legal context, there has been little research exploring the relationship
between due process protections alone and perceptions of procedural fairness. This lack
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of research partially results from the fact that the measurement of procedural justice used
in the legal context is often broad, combining both formal procedural protections and
interpersonal treatment. Most procedural justice researchers in the legal context rely
heavily on the seminal work of Tyler (Tyler; 1994; Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996; Tyler
& Lind, 1992), who has always defined procedural justice broadly and, at least until
recently (Blader & Tyler, 2003), emphasized the relative import of relational treatment
over formal procedural safeguards as influences on overall procedural justice judgments.
Despite the lack of research on this specific issue, the body of procedural justice
theory and research has clear implications for understanding the significance of due
process protections. Procedural justice research has established that opportunity for active
participation in the legal process (i.e., “voice”) can be a strong predictor of judgments of
the fairness of the procedure (e.g., Bies & Shapiro, 1988; De Cremer & Stouten, 2005;
Price, Lavelle, Henley, Cocchiara, & Buchanan, 2006; van Prooijen, Karremans, & van
Beest, 2006). “Voice” in child protection law results from various due process
protections, including the right to have an attorney advocate and the right to testify on
one’s behalf. In this dissertation, I directly manipulated voice to investigate whether
opportunity to provide one’s story, alone, influenced procedural justice judgments in the
child protection context.2
The organizational model of justice (OMJ) might be particularly useful in the
legal context. In contrast to the broad definition used in the legal psychology context, the
2

It is worth noting that federal law provides an additional mechanism for voice in
establishing the right for parents to participate in their case plan development (ASFA,
2007). I did not investigate this particular provision in this dissertation, but one can argue
that it should have a similar influence on parents’ procedural justice judgments to
opportunity to testify.
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organizational model of justice clearly distinguishes between formal procedures and
interpersonal treatment. As described earlier, organizational justice researchers reserve
the term “procedural justice” for evaluation of the process itself. Procedural justice
derives from institutional rules and policies, whereas interpersonal justice derives from
the individuals who enact those rules (Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Colquitt, 2001; Roch
& Shanock, 2006). Procedural justice, then, is akin to an evaluation of “due process,” as
defined by the law.
Further, the OMJ predicts that procedural and interpersonal justice will have
differential effects. Specifically, procedural justice likely influences institutionally
relevant attitudes and behaviors, like organizational support and organization citizenship
behaviors. Interactional justice likely influences authority-relevant outcomes, like
supervisor satisfaction. Because the organizational model of justice makes room for the
important legal distinction between due process protections and informal, interpersonal
treatment, it has the potential to be useful for understanding the role of procedural justice
in the legal context.
Procedural Justice and Parental Compliance
At its most basic, procedural justice theory predicts that when people feel that
they are being treated fairly during a legal decision-making process, then they will be
motivated to comply with whatever legal decisions or orders are made. In fact, Tyler and
Blader (2003) described their group engagement model as one that identifies underlying
motivations to engage in both discretionary and mandatory group behaviors.
Understanding, indeed facilitating, motivation to comply with legal demands is nowhere
more crucial than in the context of the child protection system. For parents involved in
the child welfare system, their compliance with caseworkers, treatment providers, and the
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courts appears to be a consistent predictor of decision-making in their case. Research
suggests that perceptions of parental compliance influence decisions to remove the child
from the home (Dalgleish & Drew, 1989; DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, & Soto, 2006;
Jones, 1993), decisions to reunite the family (Jellinek, Murphy, Poitrast, Quinn, Bishop,
& Goshko, 1992; Larrieu, Heller, Smyke, & Zeanah, 2008), and decisions to recommend
termination of parental rights (Brank, Williams, Weisz, & Ray, 2001).
Jones (1993) conducted a review of the literature on caseworker decision-making
through the 1980s and early 1990s, and observed that several studies identified parental
cooperation as one indicator caseworkers relied on in deciding whether to remove the
child from the home. Among the studies cited in Jones’s review was one conducted by
Dalgleish and Drew (1989), in which they coded 152 case-planning team files and used
that information to predict the court’s ultimate decision to issue a removal order. The
researchers coded family cooperation as low, medium, or high, and found that lack of
cooperation predicted whether the judge issued a removal order. In addition, the
researchers had neutral caseworkers code the case files and make decisions about the risk
to the children by remaining in the home. Lack of family cooperation predicted the
caseworker-coders’ perceptions of risk to the child.
Unfortunately, there is very little subsequent research examining the relationship
between family cooperation and the removal decision. However, one recent study is on
point. DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, and Soto (2006) asked 51 caseworkers in a single
state to rate the importance of a list of indicators of child wellbeing and risk factors for
child harm for making removal decisions. Parental motivation to comply, phrased by the
researchers, as the “ability to accept help/cooperate with helping agencies (DSS),” was
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included in the list. This item was given the second highest level of endorsement as an
important risk factor in the removal decision, with 27.5% of caseworkers listing it in the
top three most important factors to consider in making the removal decision. Moreover,
motivation or ability to comply was ranked as the sixth most important consideration
overall.
A small amount of research also demonstrates that perceptions of parental
compliance predict the judicial decision to reunite the family. Jellinek and colleagues
(1992) followed the course of 206 children who entered the Massachusetts child welfare
system in 1985 and 1986. They measured parental compliance with court orders, and
observed that 93% of the cases in which parents did not comply ultimately resulted in
continued loss of custody (or failure to reunify the family) at the disposition stage. In a
more recent study, Larrieu, Heller, Smyke, and Zeanah (2008) explored compliance with
an intervention program to which the court referred mothers after the child protection
agency removed their children from the home. As with the Jellinek et al. (1992) study,
90% of mothers who dropped out of the intervention program lost custody of their
children.
Together, research, theory, and commonsense all suggest that a case will not
progress smoothly through the child welfare system without the parents actively engaging
in the treatment recommendations of their caseworker and the court. Given that fact,
identifying mechanisms for promoting parental compliance would be of value to all the
players in the child protection system—caseworkers, judges, and parents. Procedural
justice theory predicts that the quality of the procedural and interpersonal treatment, as
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perceived by the parents, will influence the parents’ willingness and motivation to
comply with their own case plans.
To date, we know relatively little about predictors of parental compliance, but
some research does support applying a procedural justice framework to the topic.
Specifically, a number of studies have identified factors related to informational
treatment as important to parental compliance. For example, Kapp and Propp (2002)
conducted focus groups with parents who had been in the child protection system. A
majority of these parents complained that caseworkers provided them too little
information and that parents had difficulty making contact with them. Similarly, Drake
(1994) interviewed parents and caseworkers, and found that both groups identified
communication with parents as important.
There is also evidence that interpersonal treatment is relevant to parents’
reactions. Studies by Drake (1994), Kapp and Propp (2002), and Thoburn, Lewis, &
Shemmings (1995) all identified respectful treatment as important to parents. Parents in
the Kapp and Propp (2002) study indicated that they frequently felt disrespected by
caseworkers. Parents and caseworkers in the Drake (1994) study emphasized that worker
attitude was important. Specifically, parents said that a good caseworker should not
prejudge parents and should express an open attitude. Interestingly, caseworkers more
clearly articulated the themes of interactional justice than did parents. Caseworkers
suggested that skilled caseworkers should be able to show respect to the clients, be polite,
ask permission when looking around in their homes, be honest, and be aware that the
system can be dehumanizing. It is unclear whether this means that caseworkers are
merely more articulate about what makes a good caseworker-client relationship, possibly
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due to training, or whether these matters are actually less important to clients than
caseworkers believe they are.
Interestingly, there is weaker evidence that due process is relevant to parents.
Some studies have identified “voice,” or the opportunity to participate in the process, as
important to parents, and voice is typically associated with procedural rather than
interactional justice. Parents in the Drake (1994) study believed that they had a clear right
to participate in case plan development, although caseworkers in that study did not
identify client participation as an important goal. Similarly, many parents in the Kapp and
Propp (2002) study complained that they felt left out of the decision-making process.
Thoburn, Lewis, and Shemmings (1995) also found that parents are left out of the
case planning process. They found that only 19% of over 300 families were “active
participants,” although it is unclear whether the lack of active involvement was due to
caseworker or client barriers. There is some evidence that some caseworkers do not
actively involve parents in the process. Dumbrill (2006) interviewed parents and
identified two kinds of caseworkers: those who use power over parents and those who use
power with parents. Caseworkers who used power with parents were more collaborative,
while those who used power over parents tended to be more aggressive and threatening.
It seems, then, that procedural and interactional justices are relevant to parents’
attitudes about the child protection system and caseworkers. However, it is unclear
whether justice judgments predict behavioral outcomes, like parental compliance.
Furthermore, all of this research neglects the influence that the court process itself has on
parents’ behavioral outcomes. Judges and lawyers also interact with parents, and judges
are the ones who order parents to engage in certain behaviors. Furthermore, these studies
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neglect to account for perceptions of distributive fairness. One can assume that many
parents believe that removal of their children from the home is unfair, but we do not
know that for sure. Without taking these factors into account, we have a poor
understanding of how parental compliance is manifested in the child protection system.
To summarize, research on parental compliance lacks a systematic exploration of
the underlying mechanisms that promote or hinder it. Research on parental motivation to
comply in child protection cases, and subsequently, our understanding of it, could benefit
greatly from a theoretical foundation. One potential influence on parental compliance
might lie in parents’ perceptions of justice. It may be that motivation to comply follows
directly from perceptions of fairness and justice, which follows from parents’ own
perceptions of their treatment during the legal process. An additional purpose of this
dissertation was to explore whether procedural justice theory can account for observers’
evaluations of child protection hearings and outcomes. More specifically, the major
question is which model, if either, is best suited for explaining the way in which people
evaluate decision-making procedures and outcomes, including compliance with legal
decisions.
Study Purpose and Hypotheses
Overview of Research Design
This dissertation systematically tested the complex theoretical relationships
between justice judgments and decision outcomes in the context of a child protection
case. The general purpose of this study was to compare two theoretical models of justice:
the organizational model of justice (OMJ) and the group engagement model (GEM).
Participants read a case file, which included the petition for removal, the caseworker’s
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court report, a summary of what happened during the protective custody hearing, and a
copy of the judge’s protective custody hearing order. The case involved allegations of
child neglect, as a result of which, the mother had recently lost temporary custody of her
child. At the end of the hearing, the judge refused to return the child back to her mother’s
physical custody until the case proceeded at least through adjudication.
The study utilized an experimental between-subjects design with four
manipulated independent variables: procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity
of neglect, and decision-making role (i.e., decision-maker versus decision-recipient). The
first two manipulated variables—procedural and interactional treatment—represented the
core constructs known to affect justice judgments. For this study, interactional treatment
was a single manipulated construct, with interpersonal and informational components
manipulated simultaneously. However, I still separately measured interpersonal and
informational justice judgments. In this way, the study provided an initial test of whether
these two constructs are independent.3 In fact, as is described in the results section, the
two measures did hold up as independent constructs. Many of the analysis reported in the
results section used the interpersonal and informational justice measures instead of the
combined interactional justice measure.
The third manipulation—severity of neglect—was intended to serve as a proxy
for manipulating distributive justice. If the mother’s neglectful conduct toward her
daughter was perceived as less severe, then participants would think that the judge’s
decision to keep the child in the physical custody of Health and Human Services was less

3

Only an experimental manipulation of the constructs would definitively answer that
question, but the results of this study can lend support to Colquitt’s (2001) refinement of
interactional justice.
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fair. Some researchers argue that distributive justice judgments are a strong moderator of
the relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Cropanzano, Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005; Skarlicki,
Folger, & Tesluk, 1999).
The fourth manipulation—decision-making role—was also included to test a
moderation effect. Specifically, Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that decisionmakers, as compared to decision-recipients, are more outcome-focused when evaluating
procedural justice, interactional justice, and decision satisfaction. They also found that
decision-makers are more likely to base their judgments on their beliefs about the societal
costs and benefits of the procedures at issue, than by the traditional criteria of procedural
justice.
The remainder of this chapter lists the specific research questions that I asked in
framing this study. A brief description of the basis for the question, as well as the
hypotheses derived from it, is also included. The research questions and hypotheses
provide the framework for the results and discussion.
Research Question (RQ) 1: Which measurement model best accounts for participants’
justice judgments?
In the course of more than 30 years of procedural justice research, a number of
models have described the antecedents of justice. In this study, I compared three of these
measurement models. The first model, labeled the “traditional model,” posits that people
evaluate two types of justice: procedural and distributive. This model is present
throughout the psycholegal justice literature (e.g., Heuer, Penrod, Hafer, & Cohn, 2002;
Heuer, Penrod, & Kattan, 2007; Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2003). The second and
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third models follow from the organizational justice literature. The first of those is a threefactor model, which argues that the traditional construct of “procedural justice” consists
of two distinct constructs: procedural justice and interactional justice (Bies, 2001; Bies &
Moag, 1986). The third model, part of the organizational model of justice (OMJ)
proposed by Colquitt (2001), argues for an additional distinction. Specifically, the author
separates interactional justice into interpersonal and informational justice.
Table 1.1 illustrates these three measurement models in terms of the items used to
define each of the constructs and which justice construct each item loaded onto in each of
the models. The major difference between the traditional model and the organizational
models is that the traditional model posits that procedural justice is a single superordinate construct, which contains procedural, interactional, and interpersonal
components to differing degrees depending on the researcher. The organizational models,
on the other hand, constrain the label “procedural justice” just to evaluations of the
procedure itself and places interpersonal and informational concerns on equal, orthogonal
footing with formal procedure.
Research Hypothesis (RH) 1: In a confirmatory factor analysis, the four-factor
organizational justice measurement model will perform significantly better than
both the traditional and three-factor organizational justice models.
Table 1.1: Item Loadings for Three Theoretical Measurement Models of Justice
OMJ 2
Traditional Model OMJ 1
Item
2-Factor Model
3-Factor Model
4-Factor Model
Was the mother able to
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice
Procedural
express her views and
Justice
feelings during the
hearing procedure?
Did the mother have
Procedural Justice Procedural Justice
Procedural
influence over the
Justice
decision being made
during the hearing
procedure?
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Was the hearing
procedure free of bias?
Was the hearing
procedure based on
accurate information?
Did the hearing procedure
uphold ethical and moral
standards?
Did the judge treat the
mother in a polite
manner?
Did the judge treat the
mother with dignity?
Did the judge treat the
mother with respect?
Did the judge refrain from
improper remarks or
comments?
Was the judge candid in
his communications with
the mother?
Did the judge explain his
decision thoroughly?
Did the judge explain the
procedures thoroughly?
Were the judge’s
explanations about the
hearing procedures and
decision reasonable?
Did the judge’s decision
reflect what the mother
deserved?
Was the judge’s decision
appropriate given the
situation?
Was the decision justified
given the mother’s
performance?

Procedural Justice

Procedural Justice

Procedural
Justice
Procedural
Justice

Procedural Justice

Procedural Justice

Procedural Justice

Procedural Justice

Procedural
Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Interpersonal
Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Interpersonal
Justice
Interpersonal
Justice
Interpersonal
Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Informational
Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Procedural Justice

Interactional Justice

Informational
Justice
Informational
Justice
Informational
Justice

Distributive
Justice

Distributive Justice

Distributive
Justice

Distributive
Justice

Distributive Justice

Distributive
Justice

Distributive
Justice

Distributive Justice

Distributive
Justice

RQ 2: Do justice judgments differentially predict justice outcomes?
This research question followed from the organizational model of justice (OMJ),
which suggested that different justice judgments predict different decision outcomes.
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Figure 1.1, adapted from Colquitt (2001), illustrates the hypotheses derived from this
literature. Note that some of these hypotheses directly contradict hypotheses that the
group engagement model (GEM) implies, which are laid out as part of RQ 3. Most of the
contradictions are the result of structural differences. For example, the OMJ conceives of
decision satisfaction as an outcome, while the GEM lumps decision satisfaction together
with judgments about distributive justice. In the GEM, both distributive justice and
decision satisfaction are considered indirectly predictive of other behavioral outcomes,
rather than being outcomes themselves (compare Figures 1.1 and 1.2).
RH 2: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of procedural justice
will better predict better legal compliance expectations. In other words, those
who perceive the process itself as more procedurally fair will indicate increased
expectations that the mother in the scenario will comply with the court and reunite
with her daughter.
RH 3: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of interactional
justice will better predict leader evaluations and collective esteem.
RH 3a: Those who perceive fairer interpersonal justice to be fairer will
evaluate the judge more positively.
RH 3b: Those who perceive fairer informational justice will indicate
greater endorsement for the mother’s sense of collective esteem, or respect
derived from social identity as a parent.
RH 4: Compared to the other justice judgments, perceptions of distributive justice
will better predict decision satisfaction. Those who perceive the decision as more
distributively fair will indicate increased satisfaction with the decision, and this
relationship will be stronger than the relationship between procedural and
interactional justice and decision satisfaction.
RQ3: How well does the group engagement model account for justice outcomes?
According to Tyler and Blader (2003, Figure 1.2), the group engagement model
(GEM) is an attempt to explain the underlying mechanism that causes positive procedural
treatment to increase motivation to engage in cooperative behavior. In short, the model
argues that procedural justice influences behavioral engagement via identity judgments.
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Procedural
Justice

Interactional Justice
Interpersonal
Justice

Legal
Compliance

Leader
Evaluations

Distributive
Justice

Informational
Justice

Collective
Esteem

Decision
Satisfaction

Figure 1.1. The organizational model of justice (OMJ). Predicted relationships between justice judgments
and their associated outcomes according to the OMJ. The dashed ovals represent constructs that were not
directly manipulated in this study. Even so, they were measured and tested in select analyses. Adapted
from Colquitt (2001).
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Positive procedural treatment provides information about a person’s status in the group,
respect for the group, and identification with the group, which in turn influences their
willingness to engage in the group, including their willingness to comply with mandatory
behaviors, like legal orders. This is called the “social identity mediation hypothesis.”
Note that for this set of hypotheses, the term “procedural justice” referred to procedural
and interactional justice, combined, as is typical in the psycholegal justice literature.
RH 5: The group engagement model will adequately represent the data. More
specifically, procedural justice judgments will predict identity judgments, which
will predict participants’ predictions that the mother in the scenario will comply
with the law. In addition, perceptions of distributive justice and outcome
favorability, which is operationalized as decision satisfaction in this study, will
jointly predict identity judgments. Both procedural justice and resource judgments
will exert indirect effects on perceived likelihood of compliance.
In addition to the relationships illustrated in Figure 2, the group engagement
model specifies direct relationships where mandatory behavior is concerned:
RH 6: Perceptions of the mother’s pride as a parent will directly predict
perceptions of her likelihood of legal compliance. This hypothesis follows from
the authors’ distinction between pride and respect. Pride should reflect one’s
perceptions of the status of the larger group, so that when one is proud of their
group, they are more inclined to comply with group demands, including obeying
legal orders.
RH 7: Resource judgments—distributive justice and decision satisfaction—will
directly predict perceptions of the mother’s likelihood of compliance. According
to Tyler and Blader (2003), mandatory behaviors are distinguishable from
discretionary ones in that group-controlled resources, like incentives and
sanctions motivate their enactments, and thus, resource judgments naturally have
a more direct influence on these behaviors.
RQ 4: Does neglect severity moderate the relationships between procedural and
interactional justice judgments and their outcomes?
The organizational justice literature provides a foundation for expecting that the
severity of the mother’s neglect might influence participants’ justice judgments. In
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Figure 1.2. The group engagement model (GEM). Reproduced from Tyler and Blader
(2003).
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particular, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) and Cropanzano, Slaughter, and Bachiochi
(2005) found that evaluations of the decision, in terms of justice and approval, moderate
the relationships between procedural and interactional justice and decision outcomes. In
particular, when the perceiver considers the decision unfair and disapproves of it, then
procedural justice judgments will be more strongly predictive of other decision-related
outcomes. In other words, when distributive justice and decision satisfaction are low,
then the relationship between procedural justice judgments and other decision outcomes,
like legal compliance, will be stronger than when distributive justice and decision
satisfaction are high.
RH 8: Participants will indicate lower distributive justice and decision
satisfaction in the moderate neglect condition, as opposed to the severe neglect
condition. In this study, manipulation of the severity of neglect is intended to
serve as an indirect proxy for manipulation of distributive justice. This condition
is a prerequisite for establishing the moderator effect predicted in RH 9.
RH 9: Participants in the moderate neglect condition will exhibit weaker
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes, as
compared to participants in the severe neglect condition. Because neglect severity
influences evaluations of distributive justice and decision satisfaction, and these
constructs are known to act as moderators, neglect severity will also act as a
moderator.
RH 10: Distributive justice judgments and decision satisfaction will moderate the
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their associated
outcomes. Specifically, procedural and interactional justice judgments will have
stronger relationships to their associated outcomes when decision satisfaction and
decision satisfaction are low.
RQ 5: Does participant role—decision-maker (i.e., judge) versus decision-recipient (i.e,
parent) moderate the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes?
The final research question is inspired by recent work conducted by Heuer,
Penrod, and Kattan (2007). In a series of studies, the authors demonstrated that the
traditional relationships between justice judgments and outcomes do not always manifest.

37
Specifically, they showed that when decision-makers, rather than decision-recipients,
evaluate scenarios, their evaluations are more closely related to outcome concerns than
procedural ones. They defined “outcome concerns” as concerns about the potential costs
and benefits of the underlying acts or procedures, as well as perceptions of distributive
justice and decision satisfaction. In this study, I operationalized the societal costs and
benefits of the child protection system as concerns about infringement on parents’ rights,
beliefs about the magnitude of threat of child neglect, beliefs about the efficacy of the
child protection system, and perceptions of the fairness of child removal generally.
RH 11: As compared to decision-recipients, decision-makers’ decision
satisfaction will be more strongly related to their judgments about the costs and
benefits of child protection than to their procedural justice judgments. In other
words, whereas decision-recipients’ approval of the hearing decision in the
scenario will be strongly related to their procedural justice judgments, the same
will not be true for decision-makers. For those induced to take on the perspective
of a juvenile court judge, their understanding of the costs and benefits of the child
protection system will better predict their evaluations than will the fairness of the
procedural and interpersonal treatment in this particular hearing.
RH 12: Even when evaluating procedural justice, costs and benefits will more
strongly influence decision-makers than will traditional procedural justice
criteria. This hypothesis is derived directly from Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan
(2007), who found that decision-makers’ evaluations of procedural justice are
more strongly related to their perceptions of the societal costs and benefits of the
underlying legal procedure than to the traditional predictors of procedural justice
judgments. Translated, this hypothesis means that perceptions of the costs and
benefits of child protection will more strongly predict decision-makers’
procedural justice judgments than will the traditional procedural justice items,
which measure evaluation of the procedural, interpersonal, and informational
justice.
Note that, as is also true for the group engagement model, the definition of
“procedural justice” used by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) is less nuanced than that
used in the organizational justice literature. Specifically, the authors defined procedural
justice as a combination of procedural, interpersonal, and informational treatment.
However, the authors also noted that future research should begin exploring the role and
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strength of the moderator effect with different justice criteria. Therefore, in testing these
hypotheses, I evaluated whether role had effects on either of the relationships between
procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes.
Note that the existence of a role effect necessarily affects the relationships
hypothesized for each of the previous proposed research questions. Given that this is a
new area of research, and that most past research has evaluated decision-recipients’
judgments, all of the hypotheses derived from the past literature maybe necessarily
qualified by the role moderator effect identified by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007). For
that reason, I also selectively explored some hypotheses separately for only those
participants in the decision-recipient condition.
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Chapter 2. Method
Participants
Pilot data. Before collecting the experimental data, I pilot tested the stimulus
materials to check that the manipulations were effective. I recruited pilot participants
from the Department of Psychology subject pool at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
Pilot participants were at least 19 years old, the age of consent in Nebraska, and earned
one course credit for their participation. A total of 88 students participated in the pilot
study, but 11 did not fully complete the survey ( = 77). Each of the 16 conditions
contained between four and six participants, and each of the main effect comparisons
contained between 36 and 41 participants per group. The results of the analyses, which
showed that the manipulations were successful, appear in detail in the “Results” section
of this dissertation.
Experimental data. I recruited 320 participants from StudyResponse, a web-based
organization operated at Syracuse University that maintains a database of volunteers for
online research. Participants recruited from this subject pool were each paid $5.
Participation was limited to individuals who were at least 19 years old. In the end, 335
people entered the online survey. Of those, 12 did not actually complete any of the
measures, reducing the sample size to 323 participants, with between 17 and 22
participants per condition. Within this sample, there remained intermittent missing data.
To explore the extent of missing data, I calculated the frequency distribution for each
item, excluding demographics. There was only a small proportion of missing data for
every item—no more than 8 responses out of 323 (2.5%) per item. All analyses reported
below include completed data from the 323 participants.
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The final sample (N=323) averaged 47.58 years old (SD = 13.19). The sample
was evenly split among genders (48.0% , n = 155, self-identified as female), but was
predominantly white (90.4%, n = 292, self-identified as white). Only 24 participants
identified with a racial/ethnic group other than white, rendering racial comparisons within
the sample impossible. Most of the participants (n = 208, 64.4%) reported that they had
children. Of those who had children, the number ranged from 1 to 13 children (M = 2.36,
SD = 1.34). The average age of participants’ youngest child was 19.81 years old (SD =
12.85), ranging from less than a year old to 57 years old. The majority of respondents
with minor children (93.4%, n = 137) indicated that they currently had physical custody.
Only seven respondents indicated they did not have custody; thus, I did not explore
custody itself in subsequent analyses. Finally, when asked to indicate how liberal or
conservative they considered themselves, the average response was 3.97 (SD = 1.69)
which was just slight above the middle of the seven-point scale, where higher numbers
meant more conservative. Aside from race and custody, each of the demographic
characteristics (i.e., gender, whether a parent, number of children, and political
orientation) were explored in subsequent analyses.
Design
The experiment was a 2 (procedural treatment: unfair and fair) X 2 (interactional
treatment: unfair and fair) X 2 (level of neglect: moderate and severe) X 2 (decisionmaking role: judge or parent) between-groups factorial design. The computer program
randomly assigned participants to each of the 16 conditions after they consented to
participation.
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Procedure
Both pilot and experimental participants completed the study on a computer of
their choice going first to a URL address that sent them directly to the informed consent
page. Pilot participants entered their name, so that they could be properly assigned course
credit. Experimental participants entered their StudyResponse ID number, which allowed
StudyResponse to send them payment. After consenting, participants went to a
“Welcome” page, the sole purpose of which was to randomly assign participants to one
of the sixteen conditions. Both the informed consent and welcome pages were hosted on
the psychology department server. When participants clicked the “next” button on the
welcome page, the program randomly sent them to one of the sixteen conditions, each of
which had a separate URL link on the SurveyMonkey website. The data was stored on
the SurveyMonkey server until the researcher downloaded it. For both samples, names or
IDs were stored in a separate database and were not in any way traceable to a particular
condition or set of responses.
Once assigned to a condition, participants first completed the role induction
procedure, where they were encouraged to think about what it would be like to be either a
decision-maker (judge) or decision-recipient (parent) in a child abuse case (Appendix A).
The role induction procedure was similar to the one that Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan
(2007) used. The website instructed participants that the study was about a juvenile court
case, specifically a child abuse case. Participants in the judge condition read a statement
about what a juvenile court judge does and then imagined that they were a juvenile court
judge who frequently heard child neglect cases. They then described whether they
thought it would be easy or difficult to be a juvenile court judge, what kinds of
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information they would need to make good decisions in these cases, and how it would
feel to be this kind of judge. Participants in the parent condition imagined being a single
parent of a 10-year-old child who had just been removed from the home. They described
what it would be like to be a parent in this situation, how they would feel about attending
the hearing, and what they would expect to happen at the hearing.
Following the role induction procedure, participants read a “case file,” described
in detail below. After reading the case file, participants completed the measures:
manipulation checks; a measure of Justice Perceptions, adapted from Colquitt (2001); a
measure of Justice Outcomes, also adapted from Colquitt (2001); a measure of identity
judgments, adapted from Tyler and Blader (2001); a measure of Societal Costs and
Benefits, adapted from Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007); and demographic questions.
Materials
The “case file” described the case of Hailey Smith, born January 4, 1999, which
was loosely based on two recent cases held before the Sarpy County Juvenile Court in
Nebraska. The first screen told participants that “the next several pages will walk you
through the case file for the case of Hailey Smith. The case file contains four documents.
For each document, you will first read a description of the document’s purpose, then you
will read the actual document.” Proceeding through the study, participants then read the
Official Juvenile Petition, Official Caseworker Court Report, Protective Custody Hearing
Summary, and the Official Protective Custody Hearing Findings and Order. Each
document was on a separate webpage. The top of the webpage described the purpose of
the document, and the bottom showed the actual document.
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Official Juvenile Petition. The description of the petition stated, “The county
attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe the nature of
the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and bringing the case
before the court.” The text of the petition was in the same format and general language as
a petition in the juvenile courts of Nebraska and was largely a modification of local court
records. The petition included one manipulation—severity of neglect—and was a page
long. Both versions are included in Appendix B. The severity of neglect manipulation is
described in detail in the “manipulations” section below.
Official Caseworker Court Report. The description of the court report stated its
“purpose is for the caseworker to make recommendations to the judge about what to
order for the family.” The court report was similar in format to those actual reports
submitted by caseworkers. However, it was shorter and more concise so that the final
recommendations were more salient to participants. The report was approximately one
page, and contained no manipulations, meaning that all participants saw the same report
(Appendix C).
In the report, the caseworker made four recommendations to the court. First, the
caseworker recommended that the child remain in the legal and physical custody of
Health and Human Services. Second, she recommended that the mother participate in a
parenting assessment and parenting class. Third, the caseworker recommended that the
judge order the mother to “maintain a sanitary and safe home environment for Hailey.”
Finally, she recommended that the judge order the mother to “ensure that Hailey is
properly supervised at all times.”
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Protective Custody Hearing Summary. The description of the summary stated,
“The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.” This language is similar to that written in the Resource Guidelines
published by the National Council for Juvenile and Family Court Judges (1995).
The text of the hearing summary was a combination of dialogue and description
of what occurred at the actual hearing. Using descriptive text and dialogue allowed for
the most effective manipulation of the procedural and interactional treatment variables
(described later). In addition, the severity of neglect manipulation appeared again within
the hearing summary. The result was eight different versions of the hearing summary
(Appendix D). At the end, the hearing summary described the judge’s final decision,
which was to keep the child outside of her mother’s home pending adjudication. The
exact language of the decision varied as part of the interactional justice manipulation.
Each summary was about one and a half pages long.
Official Protective Custody Hearing Findings and Order. The Case File described
this document as “the judge’s official order at the end of the protective custody hearing. It
formalizes the decision the judge made during the hearing, including whether the child
should remain out of her mother’s home or return home pending the next hearing.” The
text and format of the order appeared as realistic as possible. Much of the language came
from form-language used in local court practice. The order did not contain any of the
manipulations, but it did reiterate the judge’s final decision to keep Hailey from returning
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to her mother’s home pending adjudication by stating, “… continued placement in the
residence is contrary to the child’s welfare because the house was found in a dirty
condition and the child was found alone without adult supervision.” As will be illustrated
below, this language was vague enough that it described both neglect conditions. The
order was less than one page long (Appendix E).
Manipulations
Procedural treatment. The eight versions of the Protective Custody Hearing
Summary provided the procedural treatment manipulation (Appendix D). While
procedural treatment manipulations vary extensively across studies, most definitions
include “voice,” or the opportunity to speak one’s side, as a key component (Bies &
Shapiro, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 2006; Colquitt, 2001). In addition,
experimental manipulations of procedural treatment usually involve a manipulation of
voice (e.g., Holbrook, 1999; Williams, 1999). For this reason, I manipulated procedural
justice in this study by varying the mother’s opportunity to personally present
information to the court during the hearing.
In both conditions, the mother’s attorney asked the court for permission for the
mother to make a statement. This is the relevant excerpt from the Summary:
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on
behalf of her client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request
on behalf of my client. Your honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a tenyear-old girl who is doing the best she can with limited resources. If it
pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to explain the
situation from her own perspective.”
In the unfair condition, the judge refused that request:
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me
from allowing Ms. Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the
case. The purpose of the protective custody hearing is merely to decide on
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the child’s placement, and parents are not allowed to provide information
at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the manner you
requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.”
In the fair condition, the judge granted that request:
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I
allow Ms. Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The
purpose of the protective custody hearing is to decide on the child’s
placement, and parents are allowed to provide information at this hearing.
Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that I may
consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.”
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge.
The emphasis on jurisdictional practice served the purpose of emphasizing that this was a
formal, legal requirement, rather than a personal decision made by the judge. Similarly,
having the dialogue occur between the judge and the attorney, rather than between the
judge and the mother, served to isolate the effects of procedural treatment and avoid
confounds with interactional justice, which would result if the communication were
interpersonal.
Interactional Treatment. Like the procedural treatment manipulation, the
interactional treatment manipulation was contained within the eight versions of the
Protective Custody Hearing Summary (Appendix D). However, components of the
interactional treatment manipulation appeared throughout the description, rather than
being limited to one paragraph. This is because the interactions between the judge and the
parent in a real case are likely to occur at multiple points in the hearing.
Researchers have identified interpersonal and informational treatment as
important dimensions of interactional justice (Bies, 2005; Colquit, 2001). The fair and
unfair conditions reflected both of these dimensions. Specifically, personal attention
varied according to the judge’s behavior toward the mother during the hearing. In the
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unfair condition, the text describes the judge as “irritated,” “disapproving,” “rude,”
“hostile,” and “irate.” When reviewing the allegations, the judge made numerous
negative comments. For example, at one point, the judge referred to the allegations in the
petition as “disgusting,” and later, the judge told the mother that he was “absolutely
appalled.” In contrast, in the fair condition, the text described the judge as “smiling,”
“interested,” and “gentle.”
Variations in the provision of information and justifications added to the
interactional factor manipulation. In the unfair condition, the judge did not make an extra
effort to explain the nature of the hearing or the decision to keep Hailey in the physical
custody of the Department of Health and Human Services. In the fair condition, however,
the judge did make an extra effort. At the beginning of the hearing, the judge spoke
directly to the mother and said:
Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody hearing. I want to explain
to you why you are here. As you know, Hailey was living with you up
until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody.
The purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was
removed and for me to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home
for now or if she is safe to be returned to your care while the case
continues. Do you understand?
“Good,” said the judge smiling.
At the end of the hearing, the judge explained his decision directly to the mother:
Ms. Smith, this means that I have ordered that Hailey live outside of your
home for the time being. I have made this decision based on what I believe
to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have read in this petition,
I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and that she is
not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what
has happened here today?
Note that this manipulation varied demeanor and justification jointly because others have
found these factors to be central components of perceptions of interactional justice (Bies
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& Moag, 1986; Bies, 2005; Colquitt, 2001). Nonetheless, I measured both informational
justice and interpersonal justice judgments.
Severity of neglect. The severity of neglect manipulation was contained in both
the Petition (Appendix B) and the Hearing Summary (Appendix C). The Petition laid out
the allegations. In both versions, there were three separate allegations and both cases
involved dirty living conditions and lack of supervision. However, the living conditions
were worse in the more severe condition. More specifically, in the severe condition: (1) a
toilet was found broken, filled with feces and urine, and feces was found on the floor; (2)
the house was filled with clothes, food containers, debris, and a strong smell of urine; and
(3) piles of rat feces were scattered throughout the home. In the moderate condition: (1)
the minor was found sitting home watching television with no adult around; (2) the child
explained that her mother worked until five and that she was always home alone from
4pm until her mother returned from work; (3) the kitchen sink, table, and counters were
full of dirty dishes and pans and there was no clean food preparation area in the kitchen.
In summary, the house was dirty and the child was found home alone in both
conditions. The fact that child was regularly unattended for a couple hours each weekday
is central to the petition in the moderate condition, but lack of supervision was not central
to the severe condition. Instead, the dirty home was central to the petition in the severe
condition, while the dirtiness was not central to the petition in the moderate condition.
This manipulation was repeated in the Hearing Summaries (Appendix D) when the judge
went through each of the three allegations one by one. Repeating the allegations also
provided a framework for part of the interactional treatment manipulation, where the
judge reacted harshly in the unfair condition.
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Measures
Appendix F contains the text of all measures. Note that pilot participants only
answered the manipulation checks and global justice judgment measures.
Manipulation checks. To check the success of the role induction manipulation, I
asked one multiple choice question: “Before you read the case, I asked you to evaluate it
from one of the following perspectives. Please select the perspective you were assigned:
County Attorney, Parent’s Attorney, Judge, or Parent.” To check the success of the
severity of neglect manipulation, I asked participants four questions. The first three were
answered on 7-point scales: 1) This was a serious case of neglect (scale: 1 (not at all
serious) to 7 (very serious)); 2) Hailey was living in a harmful environment with her
mother (scale: 1 (not at all harmful) to 7 (very harmful)); 3) Hailey was living in a dirty
home (scale: 1 (not at all dirty) to 7 (very dirty)). The fourth was a true/false question
written to verify that participants understood that Hailey was unsupervised in both
conditions.
Two items served as checks for each of the procedural and interactional treatment
manipulations. The items checking the procedural treatment manipulation were the
following two true/false questions: 1) The mother was given an opportunity to present her
story at the hearing; 2) The judge had no choice about whether to let the mother present
her story at the hearing. Note that the answer to the second question was true in all
conditions, but understanding the lack of judicial discretion was central to true procedural
treatment manipulation. Participants answered the two manipulation checks for the
interactional treatment manipulations on 7-point scales: 1) The judge expressed
disapproval of the mother (scale: 1 (no disapproval at all) to 7 (a lot of disapproval)); 2)
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The judge explained his decision to the mother (scale: 1 (no explanation at all) to 7 (a lot
of explanation)).
While the decision or outcome of the hearing remained constant in this study, it
was important that participants understood what that outcome was. Therefore,
participants answered one true/false question to measure outcome understanding: The
judge returned Hailey to her mother’s home at the end of the hearing.
Justice perceptions. The items that measured perceptions of procedural,
interactional, and distributive justice were from Colquitt’s (2001) Organizational Justice
Measure (Colquitt, 2001). The items were as true as possible to their origin, but adapted
where necessary to better fit the context. Consistent with Colquitt’s (2001) measure, all
items were written in question format beginning with “To what extent….” However, I
chose to lengthen the scale from 5 to 7 points, from 1 (to a small extent) to 7 (to a large
extent). Five items measured procedural justice criteria (e.g., To what extent was the
mother able to express her views and feelings during the hearing procedure?). Eight items
measured interactional justice criteria, four of which measured interpersonal justice
criteria (e.g., To what extent did the judge treat the mother in a polite manner?) and four
measured informational justice criteria (e.g., To what extent did the judge explain his
decision thoroughly?). Three additional items measured distributive justice criteria (e.g.,
To what extent did the judge’s decision reflect what the mother deserved?).
In addition to measuring the criteria of justice judgments, I also added three
global justice items. The items measured participants overall sense of procedural,
interactional, and distributive justice along the same 7-point scale. All justice perception
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items appear in Appendix F, with items intended to measure global justice judgments so
noted.
Justice outcomes. Justice outcomes were also adapted from Colquitt (2001). I
measured four outcomes: decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, rule compliance, and
collective esteem. Consistent with Colquitt (2001), the scale for all items were 7-point
scales from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree completely). Four items measured
decision satisfaction (e.g., The judge’s decision was acceptable.). Four items measured
leader evaluation (e.g., The judge was a good judge.). Four items measured legal
compliance (e.g., The mother will try to follow the rules of her case plan.). Finally, three
items measured collective esteem, defined in terms of a general sense of respect
(Colquitt, 2001; e.g., If most people knew the mother well, they would respect her
values.).
Identity judgments. In order to test the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader,
2003), I measured identity judgments—pride, respect, and identification. The same items
that measured collective esteem (see above) also measured respect. This is because
Colquitt (2001) operationalized collective esteem by drawing on Tyler’s earlier work
(Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996), which also formed the foundation for Tyler and
Blader’s (2003) later group engagement model. Three items measured pride (e.g., The
mother is proud to think of herself as a parent.) and four items measured identification
(e.g., Being a parent says a lot about who the mother is as a person.). Since identity
judgments overlapped with the collective esteem judgments, they were measured on the
same scale, namely, a 7-point scale from 1 (disagree completely) to 7 (agree
completely).
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Societal costs and benefits. Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) argued that
perceptions of societal costs and benefits of procedural violations drive the “decision role
moderator effect,” that is, the differential evaluations of decision-makers and decisionrecipients. Because societal costs and benefits depend entirely on the procedural context,
it was impossible to adopt the researchers’ measures for this study. I wrote items to
mirror the core idea of a cost-benefit analysis, directed toward evaluation of the costs and
benefits of child protection and child removal, both in general and with reference to this
case. These items were also measured on a 7-point scale, from 1 (disagree completely) to
7 (agree completely).
Four items measured respect for parents’ rights (e.g., In general, removal of
children from their homes is an infringement on parents’ rights.). Six items measured
magnitude of the threat of child neglect (e.g., Child neglect is a big problem in our
society). Five items measured attitudes about the efficacy of child protective services
interventions (e.g., When child protective services intervenes, the risk of child neglect is
effectively reduced.). Finally, four items measured general attitudes about the fairness of
child removal (e.g., In this case, the way that the child was removed from her home was
fair.). This latter set of items is the most tenuously related to the original ideas proposed
by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007). However, participants’ evaluations of the fairness
of the removal itself could potentially moderate the reactions to the hearing. In order to
tease out those relationships, it was important to include these items.
Demographics. Participants were asked a brief set of demographic questions: age,
gender, race/ethnicity, and liberal/conservative orientation. In addition, participants were
asked to indicate whether they had children, how many, the ages of each child, and
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whether they currently had physical custody of all minor children. If they did not have
physical custody of all minor children, participants were asked how long they had not had
custody, who had custody, and why they did not have custody.
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Chapter 3. Results
Pilot Testing: Manipulation Checks
Manipulations were verified with a combination of “percent correct” calculations,
chi-square tests, and analyses of variance (ANOVAs), depending on the item being
analyzed. For each item, the effect was measured by collapsing the sixteen conditions
into two groups representing the two levels of the manipulation being verified. In other
words, I tested only main effects, no interactions. Significant differences between groups
were tested with chi-square analyses for the True/False items and ANOVA analyses for
the scaled items. All manipulations were effective at a p < .05 level.
Two True/False items tested the manipulation of procedural treatment. Most
respondents (n = 75, 97.4%) correctly answered the item measuring respondents’
perceptions of the mother’s opportunity to present her side of the story (i.e., voice), χ2 (1)
= 69.20, p < .001. Most participants (n = 66, 85.7%) also answered the second item
correctly; there was no significance test because this was not a manipulation, meaning
that the correct answer was the same for both groups. Finally, to test the ultimate success
of the manipulation in altering procedural justice judgments, I compared participants’
global procedural justice judgments between those in the fair and unfair treatment
conditions. As expected, participants in the unfair treatment condition (M = 4.15, SD =
2.02) perceived the hearing procedure as less fair than participants in the fair treatment
condition (M = 5.16, SD = 1.61), F (1, 75) = 5.86, p = .02, ηp2 = .07.
Two items, each measured on seven-point scales assessed the interactional justice
manipulation. Participants in the unfair interactional treatment condition perceived
greater judicial disapproval of the mother (M = 6.79, SD = .62) than participants in the
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fair interactional treatment condition (M = 3.69, SD = 1.78), F (1, 75) = 102.86, p < .001,
ηp2 = .58. Similarly, those in the unfair condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.52) thought the judge
gave the mother less explanation for his decision than those in the fair condition (M =
5.64, SD = 1.31), F (1, 75) = 40.86 = p < .001, ηp2 = .35. Again, I also compared global
interactional justice judgments. Participants in the unfair condition (M = 2.92, SD = 1.87)
thought the judge treated the mother less fairly than those in the fair condition (M = 5.59,
SD = 1.65), F (1, 75) = 44.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .37.
Four items measured on seven-point scales assessed the severity of neglect
manipulation. Participants in the severe condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.31) perceived the
case as more serious than participants in the moderate condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.41), F
(1, 75) = 54.70, p < .001, ηp2 = .42. Likewise, compared to those in the moderate
condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.32), those in the severe condition (M = 5.81, SD = 1.27)
perceived Hailey’s living environment as more harmful, F (1, 75) = 75.52, p < .001, ηp2 =
.50. Those in the severe condition (M = 6.70, SD = .62) also perceived the home as
significantly dirtier than those in the moderate condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.65), F (1, 75)
= 62.58, p < .001, ηp2 = .46. Finally, because the severity of neglect manipulation was a
proxy for distributive justice, I analyzed mean differences on global distributive justice.
As expected, participants in the severe neglect condition (M = 5.51, SD = 1.30) perceived
the hearing outcome (i.e., refusal to reunite Hailey with her mother) as more fair than
participants in the moderate neglect condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.87), F (1, 75) = 34.87, p
< .001, ηp2 = .32. To confirm that participants correctly understood the outcome, they
were asked to indicate whether Hailey was allowed to return home. All participants (n =
77, 100%) responded correctly.
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The final manipulated variable was assigned role—judge or parent. The role
induction was confirmed with one multiple choice question asking participants to choose
which of four options (county attorney, parent attorney, judge, or parent) was the role
they were assigned at the beginning of the study. The majority of participants (n = 72,
93.5%) correctly answered the question, χ2 (3) = 65.50, p < .001, V = .92.
Manipulation Checks (Experimental Sample)
I ran the exact same analyses as with the pilot sample. The results followed the
same pattern, although a greater proportion of the experimental sample failed at least one
manipulation check as compared to the pilot sample, leading to generally smaller
manipulation effect sizes. Nonetheless, the majority of participants correctly answered
each dichotomous variable, group differences on continuous variables were all
significant, and most effect sizes were moderate to large.
Regarding the procedural treatment manipulation, 86.1% (n = 278) of participants
correctly answered whether the mother had no opportunity to present her side of the
story, χ2 (1) = 172.19, p < .001, V = .73, and 77.4% (n = 250) correctly answered that the
judge had no discretion in the matter. The manipulation had its intended ultimate effect:
participants in the fair treatment condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.91) perceived the process as
fairer than those in the unfair treatment condition (M = 3.94, SD = 2.37), F (1, 317) =
11.60, p = .001, ηp2 = .04. However, this was a small effect size, likely significant only
because of the large sample size. Regarding the interactional treatment manipulation,
participants in the fair treatment condition perceived less judicial disapproval toward the
mother (M = 3.89, SD = 1.88), F (1, 317) = 210.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, greater
explanation to the mother (M = 5.14, SD = 1.53), F (1, 317), 57.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .15,
and greater overall interactional justice, (M = 5.41, SD = 1.70), F (1, 313) = 125.52, p <
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.001, ηp2 = .29, as compared to participants in the unfair treatment condition (disapproval
M = 6.42, SD = 1.14; explanation M = 3.64, SD = 1.98; interactional justice M = 3.07, SD
= 2.02).
Similarly, participants in the severe neglect condition perceived the case as more
serious (M = 6.00, SD = 1.11), F (1, 321) = 208.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .39, more harmful to
Hailey (M = 6.02, SD = 1.09), F (1, 321) = 256.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .44, involving a dirtier
home (M = 6.56, SD =.91), F (1, 321) = 181.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .36, and the outcome as
more fair (M = 5.34, SD = 1.89), F (1, 317) = 113.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .26, as compared to
participants in the moderate neglect condition (seriousness, M = 3.64, SD = 1.76; harm,
M = 3.44, SD = 1.73; dirtiness, M = 4.57, SD = 1.63; distributive justice M = 3.04, SD =
1.96). Finally, most respondents (n = 279, 86.4%) correctly answered the role induction
manipulation check, χ2 (3) = 242.43, p < .001, V = .87. Similarly, most respondents (n =
303, 93.8%) correctly identified the outcome.
In total, only 193 participants correctly answered the four dichotomous
manipulation check items that had right and wrong answers. Reducing the sample size to
these respondents would result in each condition containing between 9 and 17
respondents, greatly reducing statistical power and potentially impairing the ability to
detect small effects, especially with regard to the more complex analyses conducted
herein. Therefore, I did not do this. Instead, I ran many of the analyses with both the full
sample and with the subsample of those who correctly answered all manipulation checks
(hereafter, the “correct subsample”).
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Data Screening and Scale Construction
I engaged in data screening and scale construction simultaneously. For each set of
items intended to work as a scale, I examined their skewness, kurtosis, and distribution
histograms to gauge normality (Table 3.1). As a rough guideline, I was concerned about
items with skewness over +/-.8 and kurtosis over +/- 2. However, I considered the
distribution of each item in the context of the other items in that scale, as well as the
distribution of the scale itself. In the end, none of the items were seriously abnormal and
no more than one of the items in each scale had skewness or kurtosis outside the
guidelines. For those items that did have skewness or kurtosis levels outside the
guidelines, they were only marginally beyond the threshold. For these reasons, I chose to
keep all items in their raw format. In addition to normality statistics, Table 3.1 also
reports the means and standard deviations for all items.
Once satisfied that the items had adequate distributions, I moved on to creating
the scales. First, I confirmed that the items were correlated with each other, as they
should be if they all measure the same construct. Second, I tested the scale’s reliability
using Cronbach’s alpha. I examined the Corrected Item-Total Correlation and the alpha if
each item was deleted to decide whether any items should be dropped from the scale. The
reliability statistics supported keeping every item in each scale. Finally, I created the
scales by averaging responses for each item and examined the distribution of scale scores
for normality using the same procedure as for the individual items.
All scales had adequate reliability and roughly normal distributions (Table 3.1). I
created three global justice judgment scales (procedural, interactional, and distributive). I
also created subscales for the two subcomponents of interactional justice that were used
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in certain analyses: interpersonal and informational justice. Note that even though
interpersonal and informational justice were manipulated separately, their means and
standard deviations provided some evidence that participants had varied evaluations of
the two constructs. This variability allowed me to use these subscales in place of global
interactional justice scale in many of the subsequent analyses. Higher scores on all of
these scales represented higher perceptions of fairness. As expected, all three global
scales were significantly, positively, and largely correlated with each other (Table 3.2). I
reran the analyses with the correct subsample and the same pattern emerged.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics for Scales and Items for the Full Experimental Sample
Scale/Item
Justice Judgments
Procedural Justice Scale (α = .77)
Was the mother able to express her views?
Did the mother have influence over the
decision?
Was the hearing procedure free of bias?
Did the hearing procedure uphold ethical
standards?
Interactional Justice Scale (α = .95)
Interpersonal Justice Scale (α = .98)
Did the judge treat the mother in a polite
manner?
Did the judge treat the mother with
dignity?
Did the judge treat the mother with
respect?
Did the judge refrain from improper
remarks?
Informational Justice Scale (α = .88)
Was the judge candid with the mother?
Did the judge explain his decision
thoroughly?
Did the judge explain the procedures
thoroughly?
Were the judge’s explanations reasonable?
Distributive Justice Scale (α = .98)
Did the decision reflect what the mother
deserved?

M

SD

Skewness

Kurtosis

3.88
3.31
2.39

1.42
2.27
1.77

-.01
.29
.96

-.63
-1.51
-.38

3.76
5.12

2.11
1.72

.12
-.73

-1.31
-.29

4.39
4.05
4.16

1.88
2.29
2.37

-.18
-.14
-.20

-1.26
-1.55
-1.56

3.93

2.31

-.06

-1.55

3.90

2.31

-.02

-1.55

4.24

2.48

-.23

-1.63

4.73
5.17
4.42

1.72
1.93
2.10

-.36
-.85
-.29

-.87
-.41
-1.29

4.71

2.00

-.47

-1.04

4.58
4.35
4.17

2.03
2.13
2.18

-.37
-.21
-.13

-1.09
-1.36
-1.40
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Was the decision appropriate given the
situation?
Was the decision justified given what the
mother did?
Justice Outcomes
Decision Satisfaction Scale (α = .97)
The judge’s decision was acceptable.
I am satisfied with the judge’s decision.
The mother should be satisfied with the
decision.
I agreed with the judge’s decision.
Leader Evaluation Scale (α = .98)
The judge was a good judge.
I really liked the judge.
The judge did a good job at this hearing.
I respect this judge.
Legal Compliance Scale (α = .89)
The mother will try to follow her case plan.
The mother will attend her next hearing on
time.
The mother will follow the judge’s orders.
The mother will be reunited with her
daughter.
Collective Esteem Scale (α = .95)
Most people would respect the mother’s
values.
Most people would think highly of the
mother.
Most people would approve of the mother.
Identity Judgments
Respect (same as Collective Esteem, above)
Pride (α = .89)
The mother is proud to think of herself as a
parent.
The mother is complimented by praises of
parents.
The mother talks up being a parent to her
friends.
Identity (α = .80)
Being a parent says a lot about the mother
is.
The mother feels personally responsible as
a parent.
The mother takes criticism of parenting

4.46

2.19

-.29

-1.33

4.44

2.17

-.25

-1.35

4.17
4.49
4.28
3.55

2.14
2.17
2.28
2.23

-.11
-.27
-.16
.28

-1.41
-1.35
-1.49
-1.38

4.33
4.08
4.25
3.83
4.12
4.15
5.23
5.10
5.54

2.27
2.12
2.11
2.15
2.22
2.20
1.32
1.52
1.46

-.22
-.10
-.19
.03
-.12
-.16
-.65
-.57
-.75

-1.46
-1.35
-1.25
-1.35
-1.41
-1.37
.08
-.29
-.15

5.35
4.92

1.51
1.63

-.74
-.50

-.02
-.35

3.30
3.58

1.56
1.62

.29
.10

-.48
-.54

3.34

1.67

.27

-.73

2.98

1.64

.48

-.46

3.47
3.55

1.51
1.75

.16
.12

-.26
-.80

3.59

1.67

.18

-.52

3.30

1.61

.23

-.47

4.64
4.40

1.42
1.84

-.10
-.16

-.47
-.90

4.55

1.88

-.34

-.89

4.52

1.80

-.29

-.86
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personally.
Societal Costs and Benefits
Respect for Parents’ Rights (α = .93)
Removal is an infringement on parents’
rights.
In this case, removal was an infringement.
Child protection hearings are an
infringement.
This hearing was an infringement.
Magnitude of Threat of Child Neglect (α =
.90)
Child neglect is a big problem in our
society.
In this case, I am worried about the
mother’s behavior.
I am worried about the extent of neglect in
our society.
Child neglect is a risk to children’s safety.
In this case, the mother’s behavior was a
threat.
In cases like this, our society should be
worried.
Efficacy of Child Protection as Intervention
(α = .91)
When CPS intervenes, the risk is effectively
reduced.
CPS is an effective intervention system.
Removing children from their homes is a
good strategy.
Court hearings are effective at reducing
the risks.
Court hearings are effective at reducing
the amount.
Fairness of Child Removal (α = .92)
The way the child was removed from her
home was fair.
Removing the child was a fair response.
We use fair procedures to remove children.
I approve of the removal procedures used
by society.

3.43
3.43

1.76
1.85

.17
.25

-1.03
-1.00

3.49
3.32

2.09
1.79

.25
.27

-1.27
-.90

3.45
5.38

2.03
1.30

.23
-.55

-1.21
-.50

5.57

1.46

-.71

-.44

4.81

1.82

-.52

-.72

5.57

1.48

-.79

-.21

5.92
4.96

1.29
1.88

-1.10
-.53

.59
-.83

5.41

1.64

-.80

-.32

4.36

1.42

-.15

-.38

4.31

1.69

-.20

-.73

4.26
4.64

1.65
1.65

-.24
-.25

-.59
-.64

4.38

1.57

-.21

-.40

4.21

1.65

-.19

-.50

4.41
4.33

1.73
2.13

-.16
-.18

-.96
-1.31

4.51
4.48
4.34

2.17
1.67
1.73

-.32
-.36
-.14

-1.30
-.47
-.77

I created four scales to represent each of the four measured justice outcomes:
decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem. Most,
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though not all, of the justice judgments were significantly correlated with each other
(Table 3.2). Legal compliance stood out as unrelated to all but one other justice
outcome—collective esteem. However, within the correct subsample, the correlation
between legal compliance and decision satisfaction became significant, r (188) = -.23, p
= .001, and the correlation with leader evaluation became marginally significant, r (186)
= -.13, p = .08. In general, the pattern of correlations supported the argument that these
outcomes are independent, although related. Higher scores on these scales indicated
higher decision satisfaction, more positive leader evaluation, increased predictions of
legal compliance, and greater collective esteem/respect.
Societal costs and benefits were measured with four separate constructs:
infringement of child protection on parents’ rights, magnitude of threat of neglect,
efficacy of child protection as an intervention, and fairness of child removal. To simplify
hypothesis-testing, I explored whether the former two and latter two scales could be
combined into overall costs and benefits scales. Reliability for the costs scale was
inadequate, so I kept the measures as four separate scales. Higher scores represented
higher perceptions of infringement, higher perceived threat, higher perceived efficacy,
and higher perceptions of fairness of child removal. All scales were significantly
correlated (Table 3.2). The correlations maintained their directions and significance in the
correct subsample.
To test the GEM, I measured three constructs related to social identity: pride,
respect, and social identification. These constructs were only used in structural equation

1. Procedural
Justice
2. Interactional
.64**
Justice
3. Distributive
.69**
Justice
4. Decision
.70**
Satisfaction
5. Leader
.71**
Evaluation
6. Legal
.05
Compliance
7. Collective
-.20**
Esteem/
Respect
8. Pride
-.07
9. Identification
-.04
10. Respect for
-.42**
Parents’ Rights
11. Magnitude of .43**
Threat
12. Efficacy of
.51**
CPS
13. Fairness of
.65**
Removal
ote. * p < .05 ** p < .01
.92**
.78**
-.08
-.46**

-.30**
-.16**
-.60**
.64**
.53**
.82**

.57**
.82**
.14**
-.11

-.01
.03
-.28**
.33**
.39**
.48**

.58**

.83**

.56**

.60**

-.28**
-.16**
-.61**

-.43**

-.06

.80**

.72**

.55**

.48**

-.13
-.03
-.46**

-.27**

.03

-.04

.09

.11*

.30**
.36**
.16**

.31**

-.42**

-.19**

-.43**

.72**
.44**
.60**

-.27**

-.08

-.24**

.50**
.48**

-.11

.02

.05

.32**

-.64**

-.37**

-.51**

.69**

.51**

Table 3.2. Correlations among Justice Judgment, Justice Outcome, and Social Identity Scales
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

.73**

12
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modeling, so no scale construction was necessary. However, for the sake of confirming
that the individual items were normal, I included them in the preliminary analyses and in
Table 3.1. Higher scores on these scales represented greater collective esteem/respect,
identity, and pride. All three scales were significantly positively correlated (Table 3.2),
and remained so with the correct subsample.
While the demographic variables were not central to the hypotheses, I nonetheless
did explore the influence of demographic characteristics on the relationships being
studied. Therefore, as a preliminary step, I examined the distribution of the four
continuous demographic variables that were measured: age, political orientation, number
of children, and age of youngest child. Age (M = 47.58, SD = 13.19, skewness = -.07,
kurtosis = -.78), political orientation (M = 3.97, SD = 1.69, skewness = .11, kurtosis = .63), and age of youngest child (M = 19.88, SD = 12.77, skewness = .48, kurtosis = -.70)
were fairly normally distributed, but number of children was abnormal (M = 2.34, SD =
1.34, skewness = 3.05, kurtosis = 19.77). The distribution was clearly distorted by an
outlier; one respondent had 13 children. Once that case was excluded, the distribution
became more normal (M = 2.28, SD = 1.11, skewness = 1.01, kurtosis = 1.33). For
subsequent analyses with this variable, I used the trimmed version.
Demographic Analyses
I proposed no hypotheses about relationships between demographic
characteristics and the variables of interest in this study. Nonetheless, I anticipated that
demographic characteristics might be related to the variables and those relationships
needed to be controlled. I tested for these relationships by running a series of correlations
or multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) between each of the demographics and
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all the scale scores. For continuous demographic characteristics (i.e., age, political
orientation, number of children, and age of youngest child), I ran correlations. For
dichotomous variables (i.e., gender and whether the participants have children), I ran
MANOVAs. I chose to run MANOVAs, rather than a series of ANOVAs, because the
dependent variables were all theoretically interrelated and most were statistically
correlated. Table 3.3 summarizes the results of the demographic analyses for both the full
and correct subsamples; this summary only reports the p-values and the effect sizes for
significant relations.
None of the demographic characteristics were significantly related to any of the
justice judgments, even in the correct subsample. On the other hand, two of the justice
outcomes were related to demographic characteristics. Using the full sample, collective
esteem was significantly related to two demographic characteristics: age, r (317) = -.14, p
= .01, and gender, F (1, 312) = 14.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .05. Males (M = 3.63, SD = 1.52)
attributed greater collective esteem to the mother in the case than did females (M = 2.96,
SD = 1.55). Legal compliance was marginally related to whether participants had
children, F (1, 309) = 3.99, p = .05, ηp2 = .01. However, with the correct subsample, these
relations became weaker and two became non-significant. The effect for gender on
collective esteem remained significant, F (1, 183) = 4.52, p = .04, ηp2 = .02. Again, males
(M = 3.39, SD = 1.49) had higher scores than females (M = 2.90, SD = 1.61).
The relationships between demographic characteristics and the first social
identification variable—respect—were reported in the prior paragraph, because the
respect construct in the GEM model is the same as the collective esteem construct in the

Respect for Parents’
Rights

Societal Costs and Benefits

Identity

Pride

Respect
(same as CE)

Identity Judgments

ns

p = .01, ηp2 = .04

p < .001, ηp2 = .06

p < .001, ηp2 = .04
p = .03, ηp2 = .03
ns

p = .04, ηp2 = .02

ns
r = -.11, p = .04
ns
ns

p < .001, ηp2 = .05

p = .04, ηp2 = .02

r = .14, p = .01

ns

ns

r = -.12, p = .03
ns
ns

ns

ns

ns
p = .02, ηp2 = .03
ns

ns

ns

r = -.20, p = .01
r = .21, p = .02
ns

ns

Table 3.3. A Summary of the Relations between Participant Demographics and Scale Scores for the Full Sample and the
Correct Subsample
Age
Gender
Political
Does participant Number of
Orientation
have children?
children
Justice Judgments
Procedural Justice
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
Distributive Justice
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
Interactional Justice
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
Justice Outcomes
Decision Satisfaction
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
Leader Evaluation
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
Legal Compliance
ns
ns
ns
p = .05, ηp2 = .01 ns
ns
2
Collective Esteem
r = .14, p = .01 p < .001, ηp = .05 ns
ns
ns
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ns

Fairness of Child Removal

ns

ns

p < .001, ηp2 = .08

p < .001, ηp2 = .06

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ns

ote. This table summarizes the effect sizes and significance levels for the relations displayed. It does not report the full
statistics for each test; that information is provided in the text. Where cells are split, the top row summarizes the relationship
for the full sample and the bottom row summarizes the relationship for the correct subsample.

ns

Efficacy of Child Protection

ns

Magnitude of Threat of Child r = .15, p = .01
Neglect
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OMJ. Identity was not related to any of the demographic characteristics. Pride, on the
other hand, was significantly related to four of the demographic variables: age, r (317) = .11, p = .04; political orientation, r (317) = -.12, p = .03; number of children, r (194) = .20, p = .01; and gender, F (1, 314) = 14.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .04. Compared to females (M
= 3.16, SD = 1.53), males (M = 3.79, SD = 1.43) attributed a higher sense of pride in
being a parent to the mother. In the correct subsample, the age and political orientation
effects were smaller and not statistically significant. The size effect for gender decreased
slightly, F (1, 187) = 4.77, p = .03, ηp2 = .03, again with males (M = 3.63, SD = 1.45)
reporting higher scores than females (M = 3.15, SD = 1.56). The correlation for number
of children increased slightly, r (125) = -.21, p = .02. Finally, a new effect emerged:
participants who had children (M = 4.83, SD = 1.38) attributed significantly higher
identity as a parent to the mother than participants who did not have children (M = 4.29,
SD = 1.57), F (1, 186) = 5.66, p = .02, ηp2 = .03.
Of the societal costs and benefits scales, efficacy of child protection and fairness
of removal were not significantly related to the demographic characteristics. However,
males (M = 3.84, SD = 1.70) had significantly higher scores than females (M = 2.98, SD
= 1.74) on respect for parents’ rights, F (1, 308) = 19.40, p < .001, ηp2 = .06, and males
(M = 5.08, SD = 1.25) had lower scores than females (M = 5.70, SD = 1.30) on perceived
magnitude of the threat of child neglect, F (1, 308) = 18.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .06.
Magnitude of threat was also correlated with age, r (316) = .15, p = .01. In the correct
subsample, the age effect became smaller in size and non-significant. The gender effects
remained significant. Males (M = 3.55, SD = 1.72) still had higher scores than females (M
= 2.83, SD = 1.77) on respect for parents’ rights, F (1, 182) = 7.79, p = .01, ηp2 = .04,
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although the effect size was a little smaller. In contrast, males (M = 5.17, SD = 1.26) had
lower scores than females (M = 5. 87, SD = 1.17) on magnitude of threat, F (1, 182) =
15.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .08, and that effect grew a little stronger.
In conclusion, the demographic relationships were not strongly or consistently
related to any of the theoretical measures collected for this study. They were not at all
related to justice judgments. Age, gender, and whether the participants had children were
related to a subset of the justice outcomes, but those effects were all small. The most
consistent relationship was between demographic characteristics and one of the
identification measures—pride. Pride was significantly related to whether the participants
had children, the number of children, and gender; those effects were also generally small,
although the effect for number of children was the largest in this set of analyses.
Regarding societal costs and benefits, age and gender were significantly related to two of
the measures, but these effects sizes were also small. For subsequent analyses, I
controlled for the demographic characteristics that were significantly related to the
measures used in each particular test. For example, RH 1 implicated only the justice
judgment measures, none of which were significantly related to participants’
demographics; therefore, I did not control for any demographics in testing RH 1.
RH 1: In a confirmatory factor analysis, the four-factor organizational justice
measurement model will perform significantly better than both the traditional and threefactor organizational justice models.
I conducted separate confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) testing the one-, two-,
three- and four-factor models (Table 3.4). Remember that the one-factor model combined
all justice judgments into a single latent construct. The two-factor model, typically used
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in psycholegal justice models, distinguishes between distributive and procedural justice.
The three- and four-factor models were both variations on the organizational justice
model, where the three-factor model posited that procedural, distributive, and
interactional justice were independent judgments and the four-factor model further
separated interactional justice into interpersonal and informational justice.
Table 3.4. Model Fit Statistics for Increasingly Complex Models of Justice Judgments
χ2
CFI
RMSEA
RMSEA Confidence
SRMR
Interval
Full sample
( =322)
1-factor
2741.58
.57
.28
.27-.29
.18
2-factor
1528.56
.77
.21
.19-.22
.16
3-factor
1088.49
.84
.17
.17-.18
.12
4-factor
559.60
.92
.12
.11-.13
.07
Correct subsample
( = 184)
1-factor
1476.78
.59
.27
.26-.28
.18
2-factor
877.08
.77
.20
.19-.22
.16
3-factor
590.98
.85
.16
.15-.18
.11
4-factor
370.01
.92
.12
.11-.14
.07
ote. Chi-square values were all significant at p < .0001. CFI = comparative fit index;
RMSEA = root-mean-square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean
square residual.
I used maximum likelihood estimation with Mplus Version 5.1 (Muthén &
Muthén, 1998), structural equation modeling software. Mplus offers a number of fit
indices to gauge the success of the model in describing the data. Researchers and
statisticians give different advice on which indices are better, but all generally agree that
researchers should interpret multiple indices to determine whether the model is
successful. For example, Hu and Bentler (1999) recommend that researchers use a
combination of the SRMR and one of the comparative fit indices (e.g., RMSEA or CFI)
to conclude adequate model fit. Table 3.4 reports the results of four model fit indices for
both the full sample and correct subsample: chi-square, the comparative fit index (CFI),
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the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized root mean
residual (SRMR).
The model chi-square has an advantage because it is the only commonly available
index that gives a significance value. A non-significant chi square value means that the
data fits the model well. Note that none of the CFAs evaluated here had a non-significant
chi-square value. However, the chi-square test has important limitations. First, it is a
conservative test—the model chi-square tests whether the model perfectly fits the
analyzed covariance matrix derived from the raw data. Second, the chi-square value is
inflated and the p-value deflated with large samples. Therefore, it is unwise, and often
inaccurate, to rely solely on the chi-square test to gauge model fit.
In contrast to the model chi-square, CFI (Bentler, 1990) tests the current model
against a null model where there are no relationships between the observed measures.
Generally, a CFI greater than .90 is considered an adequately-fitting model, and a CFI
greater than .95 is considered a good-fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Hu & Bentler,
1999). According to these guidelines, only the four-factor CFA reached an acceptable
level (CFI = .92).
The RMSEA is referred to as a “badness of fit” index, because it measures the
lack of fit in the model to a perfectly saturated model. One advantage of the RMSEA is
that it prefers parsimony; it will always favor the least complex of two models with
equivalent “explanatory power” (Kline, 2005). Because it measures lack of fit, lower
scores are better. Browne and Cudeck (1983) recommend that an RMSEA above .10
indicates an unacceptable fit, a value between .08 and .10 indicates mediocre fit, a value
between .05 and .08 indicates acceptable fit, and a value below .05 indicates good fit. Hu
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and Bentler (1999) suggested that a value below .06 indicates that the model has good fit,
although they encourage researchers not to rely solely on any one index to draw that
conclusion. Regardless of standard, none of the CFAs tested here had an RMSEA value
in an acceptable range. The four-factor model was closest (RMSEA = .12), but the value
was still too high to be considered even mediocre.
The SRMR measures the difference between the observed and predicted
covariance residuals. Because it is also a measure of error variance, lower values indicate
better fit. Hu and Bentler (1999) recommended using a cut-off value of .08 to reject a
model as unacceptable. Following this rule, only the four-factor CFA had acceptable fit
(SRMR = .07).
Considering the fit statistics together, and using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) rule-ofthumb, the four-factor model was accepted as an adequate description of the data. The
four-factor model was the only of the four models that had CFI and SRMR values in the
acceptable range, although it is important to note that even for the four-factor model, the
CFI was not high enough to be considered good-fitting and the RMSEA was outside the
acceptable range. In other words, even the four-factor model had room for improvement,
at least as it explained this data sample.
To make modification decisions, I used the modification indices and parameter
estimates as a guide. All indicators significantly loaded onto their latent factors. Many of
the modification recommendations were not theoretically-grounded and some were
theoretically inconsistent. In the end, I made two modifications. First, I dropped one of
the procedural justice items because it was redundant with another. Second, I correlated
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two of the interpersonal justice items to account for potential measurement error resulting
from their highly similar wording.
The modified model had good global fit, χ2 (83) = 316.04, p < .001; CFI = .96;
RMSEA = .09, RMSEA Confidence Interval: .08-.10; SRMR = .06. In fact, the CFI,
RMSEA, and SRMR all indicated acceptable fit, although the RMSEA remained a little
high. Because this model included one less item than the original four-factor model, I
could not perform a χ2 difference test to conclude that the modified model performed
significantly better. Instead, to evaluate the relative fit of the original four-factor model
with its modified version, I compared the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
Bayesian information criteria (BIC) values; lower scores indicate better fit. Both indices
of model fit supported the modified model (AIC = 15187.92, BIC = 15384.21) over the
original model (AIC = 16510.33, BIC = 16714.15).
Finally, I reran the modified model with the correct subsample. Again, the model
performed adequately, χ2 (83) = 245.71, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .10, RMSEA
confidence interval: .09-.12; SRMR = .06. Compared to the original model with the
correct subsample (AIC =10015.13, BIC =10188.74), the modified model performed
better (AIC = 9242.77, BIC =9245.25). Figure 3.1 (p. 78) illustrates the modified fourfactor model together with the structural model described in the next section.
RH 2-4: Consistent with the OMJ, relative to the other justice judgments, procedural
justice will more strongly predict legal compliance, interpersonal justice will more
strongly predict leader evaluations, informational justice will more strongly predict
collective esteem, and distributive justice will more strongly predict decision satisfaction.
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To test this set of hypotheses I started with the simplest structural model, posited
by Colquitt (2001), in which each of the justice judgments was uniquely related to each
of the justice outcomes (Figure 1.1, p. 33). This model contrasted with one that I thought
was more likely, where justice judgments were relatively stronger predictors, but not
unique predictors, of their associated outcomes,. If the simple model with single paths to
each outcome fit the data well, then there would be no need to proceed to a more complex
assessment of the relative strength of the justice judgments as predicting justice
outcomes.
I tested the simple model as a structural equation model, using maximum
likelihood estimation with Mplus software (Muthén & Muthén, 1998). Following
Bollen’s (1989) two-step approach, first I tested the measurement model, which had good
fit in the full sample, χ2 (376) = 890.24, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA
confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (376)
=688.85, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07;
SRMR = .05.
Table 3.5 reports the correlations between the latent justice judgments and the
latent justice outcomes. In general, the pattern of correlations did not support the simple
structural model. None of the justice outcomes was uniquely correlated with only one
justice judgment. In addition, of all specific hypotheses about judgment-outcome
relationships, only the relationship between distributive justice and decision satisfaction
was supported by the correlations; distributive justice had the strongest correlation with
decision satisfaction. As expected most of the justice judgments were significantly related
to the justice outcomes, suggesting that each judgment might load onto multiple
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outcomes. Importantly, collective esteem was negatively correlated with three of the
justice judgments—procedural, informational, and distributive. And, in the correct
subsample, legal compliance was negatively correlated with procedural and distributive
justice. This negative correlation indicated that increasingly fair treatment was related to
a decreased perception that the mother should feel a sense of respect. These negative
relationships are contrary to the OMJ theory and Colquitt’s (2001) findings.

Table 3.5. Correlations between Latent Justice Judgments and Latent Justice Outcomes in
the Organizational Model of Justice
Legal
Decision
Leader
Collective
Compliance
Satisfaction
Evaluation
Esteem
Procedural Justice
Full: .08
Full: .84**
Full: .84**
Full: -.37**
Sub: -.15*
Sub: .83**
Sub: .83**
Sub:-.52**
Interpersonal Justice

Full: .09
Sub: .04

Full: .47**
Sub: .45**

Full: .77**
Sub: .79**

Full: -.04
Sub: -.14

Informational Justice Full: .13*
Sub: -.05

Full: .66**
Sub: .60**

Full: .85**
Sub: .84**

Full: -.21**
Sub: .30**

Distributive Justice

Full: .94**
Sub: .93**

Full: .81**
Sub: .78**

Full: -.48**
Sub: -.61**

Full: -.07
Sub: -.26**

ote. Full sample (“Full”) N = 320, correct subsample (“Sub”) n = 177.
* p < .05 ** p < .01.

Based on the results of the first step, I concluded that the measurement model was
acceptable and moved on testing the structural model. To begin, I tested the simple
structural model proposed by Colquitt (2001) wherein each justice judgment was
uniquely linked to an individual justice outcome, adding the relevant demographic
variables as controls. The simple model had poor fit in the full sample, χ2 (463) =
1402.45, p < .001; CFI = .93; RMSEA = .08, RMSEA confidence interval: .08-.08;
SRMR = .13, but slightly better fit in the correct subsample, χ2 (463) = 1021.51, p < .001;
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CFI = .93; RMSEA = .08, confidence interval: .07-.9; SRMR = .14. For the full sample,
the CFI was in the acceptable range, the RMSEA was in the mediocre range, and the
SRMR was in the unacceptable range.
Because I expected each of the justice judgments to load onto multiple justice
outcomes, but did not have specific expectations about these relative relationships, I next
tested a model in which all four justice outcomes were each regressed onto each of the
four justice judgments (i.e., the “full path model”). This model fit well in the full sample,
χ2 (451) = 1023.08, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06, confidence interval: .06-.07;
SRMR = .05, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (451) = 296.10, p < .001; CFI = .96;
RMSEA = .06, confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05. For both samples, the
modification indices suggested correlating two of the indicators on the informational
justice construct, which I did (full sample: χ2 (450) = 985.63, p < .001; CFI = .96;
RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .05; correct subsample: χ2
(450) = 772.93, p < .001; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .05.07; SRMR = .05).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the modified full-path model and standardized parameter
estimates from the full sample. While the model as a whole was well-supported, there
was mixed support for the hypotheses about specific relationships between justice
judgments and outcomes proposed by the OMJ. As predicted, interpersonal justice was
the strongest predictor of legal compliance and distributive justice was the strongest
predictor of decision satisfaction. There was partial support for the hypothesis regarding
procedural justice. Procedural justice significantly predicted legal compliance, but it was
not the strongest predictor. Instead, distributive justice was the strongest predictor of
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legal compliance. Finally, there was no support for the hypothesis that informational
justice would most strongly predict collective esteem. In fact, the path from informational
justice to collective esteem was not significant; instead, distributive justice most strongly
predicted collective esteem.
Beyond the relationships described above, the results of this analysis provided
additional information that was contrary to the OMJ. To begin with, distributive justice
was the most consistent predictor of justice outcomes. In addition, the model included
two negative parameter estimates, both of which were contrary to the OMJ. First,
distributive justice negatively predicted legal compliance. Second, distributive justice
negatively predicted collective esteem, meaning that higher judgments that the outcome
was fair led to decreased perceptions that the mother should be respected.
As an exploratory step, I ran a final set of models. The arguments underlying the
OMJ presuppose that the person evaluating the decision-making situation is the recipient
of the decision. However, in this study, I manipulated whether participants were decisionmakers or decision-recipients. As a final analysis, I reran the modified full path model
separately for those assigned to be parents and those assigned to be judges. For assigned
parents, the model was acceptable, χ2 (450) = 852.53, p < .001; CFI = .94; RMSEA = .08,
RMSEA confidence interval: .07-.08; SRMR = .06. In contrast, the model would not
converge for the assigned adults, suggesting that this model of justice does not translate
to decision-makers’ justice judgments and outcomes.
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Figure 3.1.
Results of the organizational model of justice (OMJ), modified full path version. For
indicators, the labels correspond to their order in the measure (Appendix F). All indicator
loadings were significant. For paths, standardized estimates are reported here. Only
significant paths are drawn. All latent factor variances were set to 0. Abbreviations: e =
error, d = disturbance.
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RH 5-7: The group engagement model will adequately represent the data. All paths
specified by the model will be significant.
I tested this hypothesis in a structural equation model. First, I converted the GEM,
as illustrated by Tyler and Blader (2003; Figure 1.2, p. 35), into a higher-order structural
equation model. The first-order latent constructs were the four justice judgments
(procedural, interpersonal, informational, and distributive), decision satisfaction, three
identity judgments (pride, respect, and identification), and legal compliance. The secondorder latent constructs were procedural justice, which was measured by procedural,
interpersonal, and informational justice judgments; resource judgments, which were
measured by distributive justice and decision satisfaction; and social identity, which was
measured by pride, respect, and identification.
For the most part, this translation of the model was consistent with theory and
with the authors’ subsequent work (Blader & Tyler, 2009). However, certain changes
should be considered modifications of the underlying theoretical model. First, I replaced
the four-component model of procedural justice proposed by Tyler & Blader (2003) with
the three components (i.e., procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice) from the
organizational model of justice. Second, while the original model distinguished between
psychological and behavioral engagement and further between discretionary and
mandatory behavioral engagement, I included only “engagement” in this structural
model, which was defined in terms of perceived likelihood that the mother would comply
with the law. The design of this study prevented me from measuring actual compliance
and this measure was the best substitute.
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I began by testing the measurement model. Because the measurement model was
so large, I divided it into several portions—procedural justice, resource judgments, social
identity, and legal compliance—and tested each independently. I started with the
procedural justice measurement model. Even making recommended modifications, the
model had poor fit in the full sample, χ2 (51) = 384.53, p < .001; CFI = .92; RMSEA =
.14, RMSEA confidence interval: .13-.16; SRMR = .13.
Because the hierarchical model was unacceptable, I next tested a model that
would be more consistent with the organizational model, which proved well-fitting in
earlier analyses. This model consisted of three latent factors—procedural, interpersonal,
and informational justice—but no second-order justice judgment. The model was
acceptable in the full sample, χ2 (51) = 249.20, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .11,
RMSEA confidence interval: .10-.12; SRMR = .07, and marginally acceptable in the
correct subsample, χ2 (50) = 178.41, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .11, RMSEA
confidence interval: .0-.13; SRMR = .09. I replaced this measurement model with the
hierarchical one proposed by Tyler and Blader (2003; Blader & Tyler, 2003), which also
required modifying the structure of the group engagement model to add paths from each
of the three types of justice to social identity, rather than just a single path from the
second-order procedural justice factor.
The measurement model for resource judgments had excellent fit in both the full
sample, χ2 (13) = 26.93, p = .01; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval:
.03-.09; SRMR = .01, and the correct subsample, χ2 (13) = 28.96, p = .01; CFI = .99;
RMSEA = .08, RMSEA confidence interval: .04-.12; SRMR = .01. The social identity
measurement model also had excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (31) = 58.28, p = 002;
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CFI = .99; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .03-.07; SRMR = .03; and the
correct subsample, χ2 (31) = 42.46, p = .08; CFI = .99; RMSEA = .04, confidence
interval: .00-.07; SRMR = .03. Finally, the measurement model of legal compliance had
excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (2) = 3.46, p = .18; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA
confidence interval: .00-.13; SRMR = .01, and in the correct subsample, χ2 (2) = 3.20, p =
.20; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .00-.16; SRMR = .02.
After confirming the measurement portion of the GEM, I tested the structural
model (Figure 3.2). The model also included demographic variables as controls. They are
not shown in the drawing, but they are reported in Table 3.6. Because the heart of the
GEM is that perceptions of social identity mediate the relationships between justice
judgments and resource judgments, on the one hand, and group engagement, on the other,
I also measured indirect effects from procedural justice, interactional justice, and
resource judgments to legal compliance via social identity. The indirect effect sizes are
reported in Table 3.7.
Table 3.6. Standardized Parameter Estimates for Demographic Variables in the Group
Engagement Model in the Full Sample
DV: Social Identity
DV: Legal
Compliance
Estimate
S.E.
Estimate S.E.
Age
-.06
.06
.10
.06
Gender
.18**
.05
-.13*
.06
Political Orientation
-.05
.05
.08
.06
Whether Participants Had Children
.12
.09
.03
.09
Number of Children
-.18*
.09
.07
.09
ote. DV = Dependent Variable. S.E. = Standard Error. Gender was coded 0 (female)
and 1 (male). Whether participants had children was coded 0 (no) and 1 (yes). Political
orientation was scaled so that higher scores indicated greater self-reported conservatism.
* p < .05 ** p ≤ .01.

Figure 3.2. Results of the group engagement model (GEM). For indicators, the labels correspond to their order in the
measure (Appendix F). All indicator loadings were significant. All drawn paths were theoretically predicted to be
significant. Solid lines represent paths that were significant; dashed lines represent non-significant paths.
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Table 3.7. Indirect Effects of Justice and Resource Judgments on Legal Compliance Via
Social Identity in the Full Sample
Estimate
S.E.
Procedural Justice
.20
.26
Interpersonal Justice
.18
.13
Informational Justice
.22
.23
Resource Judgments
-1.10*
.04
ote. S.E. = Standard Error.
*p < .05.
The model had excellent fit in the full sample, χ2 (612) =1189.50, p < .001; CFI =
.95; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06; SRMR = .06. While the overall
model fit was excellent, there was only partial support for the individual paths specified
by the group engagement model. The core hypothesis of the GEM is that social identity
judgments mediate the relationships between justice judgments and group engagement.
That hypothesis was not supported by this data. First, social identity was not a strong
predictor of legal compliance; while the standardized estimate was significant, the
unstandardized estimate was not. Second, neither procedural, interpersonal, nor
informational justice significantly predicted social identity, meaning that social identity
did not mediate the relationships between these justice judgments and legal compliance.
The social identity mediation hypothesis was supported with respect to resource
judgments; the indirect effect from resource judgments to legal compliance via social
identity was significant.
As predicted, resource judgments directly predicted legal compliance, so that
increased decision satisfaction and fairness led to increased confidence that the mother
would comply with the court and the case plan. In general, resource judgments had a
greater influence on the outcome variables in this model than did procedural,
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interpersonal, and informational justice; this is also inconsistent with the GEM. As a final
note, pride did not directly predict legal compliance.
Because justice judgments did not predict legal compliance indirectly via social
identity judgments, as predicted by the group engagement model, I explored whether an
alternative model that added direct paths between these justice judgments and legal
compliance would perform better. The model was exactly the same aside from the
addition of these three paths, and it also had excellent fit, χ2 (609) = 1176.47, p < .001;
CFI = .95; RMSEA = .05, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06; SRMR = .06. In this
model, the direct path between procedural justice and legal compliance was significant (β
= .38, p = .046), but interpersonal and informational justice judgments were not
significant predictors of legal compliance. Adding the direct paths did little, then, to add
explanatory power to the model.
I reran the GEM, without the additional direct paths between justice and legal
compliance, using the correct subsample. The model retained its excellent fit, χ2 (612) =
1006.01, p < .001; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .06, RMSEA confidence interval: .05-.06;
SRMR = .06. Again, all factor loadings were significant and all residual variances were
small. The pattern of significant paths was almost identical to that with the larger sample,
with one important exception: there were was not a significant direct effect between
resource judgments and legal compliance. Nonetheless, the indirect effect between
resource judgments and legal compliance remained significant. In all other ways, the path
structure was the same as with the full sample.
Finally, as with the OMJ, the theory underlying the GEM presupposes that the
people evaluating the situation and inferring information about their social identity are
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decision-recipients. I fit the GEM separately to assigned parents and assigned judges. As
with the OMJ, the model did not converge for the assigned judges. In contrast, the model
had marginally acceptable fit for the assigned parents, χ2 (612) = 1025.94, p < .001; CFI
= .93; RMSEA = .07, RMSEA confidence interval: .06-.07; SRMR = .07, and different
parameter estimates compared to the full sample. Specifically, for assigned parents,
interpersonal justice did predict social identity, even though it did not for the full sample.
On the other hand, the significant relationship between social identity and legal
compliance dropped out. Therefore, there was still no support for the social identity
mediation hypothesis. In addition, resource judgments directly predicted social identity,
but ceased to predict legal compliance. In the assigned parents sample, none of the
theorized predictors of legal compliance was significant, although the parameter estimate
for resource judgments was marginally significant, p = .10.
RH 8-9: Participants in the moderate neglect condition will report lower distributive
justice and decision satisfaction than participants in the severe neglect condition.
Participants in the moderate neglect condition will exhibit weaker relationships between
procedural and interactional justice and their outcomes than participants in the severe
neglect condition.
I tested these hypotheses simultaneously using a multivariate analysis of
covariance (MANCOVA) in which three of the four manipulations (procedural treatment,
interactional treatment, and neglect severity) were entered as factors and distributive
justice, decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem
were entered as dependent variables. Based on the preliminary analyses, I also included
age, gender, and whether participants had children as covariates.
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All three demographic variables had significant multivariate effects, although they
all had fairly small effect sizes: age, F (5, 293) = 2.56, p = .03, ηp2 = .04; gender, F (5,
293) = 2.47, p = .03, ηp2 = .04; whether participants’ had children, F (5, 293) = 2.52, p =
.03, ηp2 = .04. The between-subjects tests revealed patterns consistent with preliminary
analyses. Specifically, age, F (1, 297) = 4.45, p = .04, ηp2 = .02, and gender, F (1, 297) =
6.86, p = .01, ηp2 = .02, were significantly related to perceptions of collective esteem, but
not to any of the other dependent variables. None of the between-subjects tests reached
significance for whether participants had children.
As expected, there were significant multivariate effects for both interactional
treatment, F (5, 293) = 29.83, p < .001, ηp2 = .34, and severity of neglect, F (5, 293) =
32.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .36. Surprisingly, there was no multivariate effect for procedural
treatment. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the means and significance tests for the significant
between-subjects effects for the interactional treatment and severity of neglect
manipulations. As hypothesized, participants in the severe neglect condition reported
higher distributive justice and decision satisfaction than those in the moderate neglect
condition. This finding confirms that the severity of neglect manipulation did serve as a

3.10 (2.00)
3.89 (2.14)

Leader Evaluation

Distributive Justice

4.79 (2.05)

5.08 (1.73)

4.58 (2.11)

Fair Treatment Condition

21.74

107.53

16.35

value

.07

.27

.05

(ηp2)

3.29 (1.98)
5.45 (1.33)
3.95 (1.31)
3.15 (1.94)

Leader Evaluation

Legal Compliance

Collective Esteem

Distributive Justice

ote. All group differences were significant at p < .01.

3.02 (1.91)

Decision Satisfaction

Severity of Neglect

Moderate Neglect Condition

5.58 (1.57)

2.59 (1.48)

5.02 (1.27)

4.96 (1.90)

5.36 (1.66)

Severe Neglect Condition

142.87

59.65

8.95

75.27

127.79

value

.33

.17

.03

.20

.30

(ηp2)

Table 3.9. Significant Group Differences on Justice Outcomes for the Severity of Neglect Manipulation in the Full Sample
M (SD)
F (1, 297) Effect size

ote. All group differences were significant at p < .01.

3.77 (2.09)

Decision Satisfaction

Interactional Treatment

Unfair Treatment Condition

Table 3.8. Significant Group Differences on Justice Outcomes for the Interactional Justice Manipulation in the Full Sample
M (SD)
F (1, 297) Effect size
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proxy for a manipulation of distributive justice. However, contrary to the hypothesis,
there were no significant interactions between severity of neglect and interactional or
procedural justice. Thus, severity of neglect did not reduce the strength of the relationship
between procedural and interactional justice judgments and their associated outcomes.
In addition to the effects described above, participants in the high severity
condition reported higher leader evaluation, lower legal compliance, and lower collective
esteem. The interactional treatment manipulation was significant for three of the
dependent variables. Those in the fair interactional treatment condition reported higher
levels of decision satisfaction, leader evaluation, and distributive justice.
As a final test, I reran the MANCOVA with just those participants who correctly
answered the manipulation checks. The results were largely identical. The only difference
was that there were no significant multivariate effects for any of the demographic
characteristics.
RH 10: Distributive justice judgments and decision satisfaction will moderate the
relationships between procedural and interactional justice and their associated
outcomes.
I ran three sets of regression analyses, each using a different justice outcome
(leader evaluation, legal compliance, and collective esteem) as the dependent variable
(Table 3.10). As independent variables, in the first step, I entered the procedural,
interpersonal, informational, and distributive justice scales, as well as the decision
satisfaction scale and relevant demographic variables. In the second step, I added twoway interaction terms representing interactions between each of the three justice
judgments of interest and both distributive justice and decision satisfaction.
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The first regression predicted leader evaluation. Because preliminary analyses
revealed no related demographic characteristics, I did not control for demographics in
this regression. The first step, with only main effects, was statistically significant, R2 =
.86, F (5, 297) = 364.67, p < .001. There were significant main effects for interactional
justice, informational justice, decision satisfaction, and distributive justice. The second
step was also statistically significant, R2 = .86, F (11, 291) = 170.18, p < .001, but it was
not significantly better than the regression with only main effects. Contrary to
hypotheses, there were no significant interactions with distributive justice and decision
satisfaction, meaning that these judgments did not moderate the relationships between the
other justice judgments and leader evaluation. In the second step, the main effects for
procedural justice and interactional justice were significant.
The second set of regressions predicted legal compliance. All the same variables
were entered with the addition of whether participants had children, because preliminary
analyses revealed that this variable was related to participants’ predictions about legal
compliance. Again, the main effects regression was significant, R2 = .09, F (6, 295) =
4.85, p < .001, but note that the variables accounted for quite less variance compared to
the model predicting leader evaluation. Two justice judgments were significant predictors
of legal compliance: informational and distributive justice. No other variables were
significant. The second step was also significant, R2 = .10, F (12, 289) = 2.79, p = .001,
but it was not significantly better than step one. Again, there were no significant
interactions. In the second step, the only significant predictor of legal compliance was the
main effect for informational justice.
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The final set of regressions predicted collective esteem (Table 3.10). Again all the
justice judgments and decision satisfaction were entered, along with gender and age. Step
one, the regression with just main effects and demographics, was significant, R2 = .33, F
(7, 293) = 20.12, p < .001, with interpersonal justice, distributive justice, and gender all
significantly predicting collective esteem. The second step was also significant, R2 = .36,
F (14, 286) = 11.39, p < .001, and accounted for significantly more variance than the first
model, R2∆ = .03, F∆ (7, 286) = 2.12, p = .04. The main effect for distributive justice
remained significant, as did the main effect for gender.
As hypothesized, there was a significant interaction effect for interactional and
distributive justice in predicting collective esteem. To follow-up, I performed a median
split for distributive justice and then correlated interpersonal justice and collective esteem
for the two samples. For participants who perceived the outcomes as fair (i.e., high
distributive justice), interpersonal justice was correlated with collective esteem, r (164) =
.24, p < .001; however, for those who perceived the outcome as unfair, there was no
significant relationship between interpersonal justice and collective esteem. Thus,
reactions to the outcome moderated the relationships between interactional justice and
collective esteem, although it is important to note that this moderation effect was in the
opposite direction predicted. Prior researchers (e.g., Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996) found
that the relationship between interactional justice and justice outcomes was stronger
when distributive justice was low; in this sample, the relationship was stronger when
distributive justice was high.

Table 3.10. Do Distributive Justice and Decision Satisfaction Moderate the Relationships Between Other Justice Judgments
and Their Outcomes? Standardized Beta Weights for Regression Models Predicting Justice Outcomes in the Full Sample
Leader Evaluation
Legal Compliance
Collective esteem
Step 1
Step 2
Step 1
Step 2
Step 1
Step 2
Main Effects
Procedural Justice
.03
.16*
.04
.03
.10
-.20
Interpersonal Justice
.38**
.50**
-.06
-.21
.24**
.00
Informational Justice
.17**
-.07
.38**
.50
-.06
.16
Distributive Justice
.12
.22
-.42**
.18
-.65**
-1.38**
Decision Satisfaction
.41**
.19
.12
-.46
.04
.55
Interaction Effects
PJ * DJ
-.40
-1.12
1.27
PJ * DS
.17
1.17
-.70
IntJ * DJ
-.24
.86
1.28*
IntJ * DS
.04
-.63
-.94
InfJ * DJ
.36
-.64
.49
InfJ * DS
.17
.39
-.90
ote. Step 1 included all main effects and controlled demographic variables. Step 2 added the interactions of interest.
* p < .05 ** p < .01.
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As a final step, I reran all the analyses with only the correct subsample. The
pattern of results largely replicated the full sample, with one exception. I found evidence
of moderation in the regression predicting legal compliance, where procedural justice
interacted with distributive justice. Follow-up analyses showed no significant correlation
between procedural justice and legal compliance for either participants with high
distributive justice or those with low distributive justice. It is likely that there was too
little power with the correct subsample to detect differences between the two groups.
RH 11-12. As compared to decision-recipients, decision-makers’ decision satisfaction
will be more strongly related to their judgments about the costs and benefits of child
protection than to their procedural justice judgments. Even when evaluating procedural
justice, decision-makers will be more strongly influenced by costs and benefits than
traditional procedural justice criteria.
Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that a person’s role in the decisionmaking process affected their perceptions of justice and satisfaction with the decision.
Specifically, they found that decision-makers were more influenced by outcome
concerns, which they defined as distributive justice and an analysis of societal costs and
benefits, when they made judgments about procedural justice and decision satisfaction. In
contrast, decision-recipients were more influenced by the traditionally defined
prerequisites to justice judgments, which they operationalized as process neutrality and
positive interpersonal treatment.
As a preliminary step, I investigated whether participants in the different role
conditions reported different levels on the justice judgments, justice outcomes, and
societal costs and benefits by running a series of ANOVAs comparing mean differences
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between assigned judges and assigned parents on each of the dependent variables. The
only significant difference was in perceived respect: assigned judges (M = 3.09, SD =
1.48) rated significantly less respect than assigned parents (M = 3.53, SD = 1.63), F (1,
317) = 6.51, p = .01. Therefore, contrary to expectations, in this study, decision-makers
and decision-recipients rated the scenario fairly similarly along all of the dimensions
measured.
Despite the minimal group differences between decision-makers and decisionrecipients, the possibility of interaction effects remained. To test for these, I ran a series
of multiple regressions for each of three dependent variables—global procedural justice,
global interactional justice, and decision satisfaction (Table 3.11). For the independent
variables, I entered participants’ procedural, interactional, and distributive justice scale
scores, which reflected perceptions of the traditional justice criteria. In addition, I entered
the four societal costs and benefits scales—respect for parents’ rights, magnitude of the
threat of neglect, efficacy of the child protection system, and fairness of child removal. I
entered all the two-way interaction terms between induced role and each of the other
predictors. Significant interaction terms would suggest that role as a decision-maker
versus a decision-recipient moderated the traditional relationships between procedural
justice criteria and judgments. Regardless of whether interactions were present, I also ran
the regressions separately for induced judges and induced parents, without the two-way
interactions; this analysis allowed me to compare beta weights to evaluate the relative
strength of the various predictors.

.02
.71**
-.06
-.06
.03
.16*

Interactional Justice Scale

Distributive Justice Scale

Respect for Parents’ Rights

Magnitude of Threat

Perceived Efficacy of CPS

Fairness of Child Removal

.02

Gender

.03

.04

.16*

-.01

.01

-.01

.74**

.01

.05

Judges

.03

-.08

.10

.00

-.03

-.17**

.33**

.04

.41**

Parents

ote. These regressions were conducted with the full sample of participants.
* p < .05 ** p < .01.

-.02

Age

Controls

.10*

Procedural Justice Scale

Main Effects

Parents

-.05

-.02

-.05

.17**

-.01

.02

.43**

.10

.41**

Judges

.03

-.07

.07

.07

-.08

-.10

.14

.62**

.13

Parents

.00

-.03

-.07

-.04

-.03

-.07

.36**

.65**

.06

Judges

Table 3.11. Do Decision-Makers and Decision-Recipients Evaluate Decision Satisfaction, Procedural Justice, and
Interactional Justice Differently? Results of Separate Regression Models for Induced Parents and Induced Judges
Global Procedural Justice Global Interactional Justice
Decision Satisfaction
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I found only weak support for the hypothesis with regard to the first dependent
variable—decision satisfaction. In the regression with the full sample, R2 = .88, F (16,
278) = 127.51, p < .001, there were no significant role interactions, suggesting that role
was not a moderator where evaluations of the decision were concerned. In the separate
regressions, distributive justice and fairness of removal were the strongest predictors for
both samples, again, suggesting that induced judges and induced parents were evaluating
the decision similarly. However, there was also a significant effect for procedural justice
for parents, but not judges, which provided some support for the argument that parents
were more influenced by traditional procedural justice criteria when evaluating decisions,
but this effect was not strong enough to cause a significant role by procedural justice
interaction in the full sample.
I found arguably stronger support for the hypothesis with regard to the second
dependent variable—global perceptions of procedural justice. There were still no
significant role interactions in the full-sample regression, R2 = .78, F (16, 279) = 63.04, p
< .001; however, a comparison of the beta weights for induced judges and induced
parents showed that induced parents relied more strongly on traditional procedural justice
criteria than outcome criteria when evaluating procedural justice. Induced judges, on the
other hand, had a higher beta weight for distributive justice and a significant and higher
beta weight for perceived efficacy of the child protection system, both of which are
outcome concerns.
I found even stronger support for the hypothesis with the third dependent
variable—global perceptions of interactional justice. Here, there was a significant
interaction between induced role and distributive justice judgments, β = -.27, model R2 =
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.81, F (16, 277) = 75.49, p < .001. Separate regressions for each induced role showed that
induced judges’ evaluations of interactional justice were influenced by distributive
justice, while induced parents’ evaluations of interactional justice were not.
In sum, these analyses provided some support for Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan’s
(2007) contention that decision-makers are more outcome-focused when they evaluate
procedural justice, interactional justice, and decision satisfaction. Compared to decisionrecipients, decision-makers were more strongly influenced by distributive justice and
certain societal costs and benefits, specifically, perceived efficacy of the child protection
system and fairness of child removal. Decision-recipients, on the other hand, were more
influenced by the traditional criteria of procedural justice. Nonetheless, in this study,
even decision-recipients were heavily influenced by distributive justice.
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Chapter 4. Discussion
Overview of Design and Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation was to evaluate the utility of justice models in the
child protection context. I tested two models of procedural justice: the organizational
model of justice (OMJ; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001) and the group engagement
model (GEM: Tyler & Blader, 2003). In addition, I tested two potential moderators of the
relationship between procedural justice and justice outcomes, both based on prior
research. Building on work by Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) and others (Cropanzano,
Slaughter, & Bachiochi, 2005; Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk, 1999), I investigated whether
outcome judgments acted as a moderator, such that procedural justice was a more
powerful influence on outcomes when distributive justice and decision satisfaction were
low. Finally, building on work by Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007), I tested whether the
role of the evaluator as a decision-recipient or decision-maker acted as a moderator, such
that decision outcomes and societal costs and benefits influenced decision-makers more,
while traditional relational criteria influenced decision-recipients more when they
evaluated procedural and interactional justice.
To achieve this purpose, I created an experimental factorial design in which I
manipulated procedural treatment, interactional treatment, severity of neglect, and
assigned role. The first two manipulations were designed as straightforward
manipulations of the traditional procedural justice criteria. The third manipulation was
used to test the moderator effect of outcome concerns (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996),
and was demonstrated to directly cause differences in distributive justice judgments. The
final manipulation was used to directly test the moderator effect of the evaluator’s role;
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participants were assigned to be either a judge (i.e., decision-maker) or parent (i.e.,
decision-recipient).
Finally, the context of the test was child protection decision-making. Participants
read a case file that described a case of child neglect. There is reason to believe that
perceptions of justice might bear a strong influence on parents’ behavior within the child
protection system, including their compliance with the requirements of their caseplan
(Dumbrill, 2006; Drake, 1994; Kapp & Propp, 2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings,
1995). In addition, we know that judges and caseworkers weigh their perceptions that the
parents are compliant heavily in their own decision-making in these cases (Dalgleish &
Drew, 1989; DeRoma, Kessler, McDaniel, & Soto, 2006; Jellinek et al., 1992; Jones,
1993; Larrieu et al., 2008). In short, this evidence suggests that procedural justice theory
would be an appropriate framework for understanding parents’ compliance in child
protection cases. This study was an initial test of whether reactions to procedural
treatment during child protection hearings might have carryover effects on parents’
willingness to comply with the law.
Summary of Results
RQ 1: Which measurement model best accounts for participants’ justice
judgments? Over the past thirty years, justice researchers have proposed several
measurement models of procedural justice. Each model makes the argument that people
evaluate justice along a specific number of domains, between two and four. Arguably, the
authors did not intend the first and simplest measurement model to be a measurement
model at all, but rather, an introduction to the concept of procedural justice. Starting with
Thibaut and Walker (1975), legal psychologists argued that perceptions of distributive
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justice (i.e., outcome fairness) were not people’s sole concern nor were they people’s sole
determinants of their perceptions of the favorability of the outcome. Instead, argued these
researchers, procedural justice judgments were equally, perhaps more, relevant.
Following Thibaut and Walker’s seminal work, justice researchers adopted this
two-factor framework and developed it fully in the literature. During the 1980s, legal
psychologists like Leventhal (1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980) and Tyler (1984,
1988, 1989) began a line of research attempting to identify exactly what criteria make a
legal procedure seem fair to people. This line of work marked the beginning of
attempting to identify a measurement model of justice judgments, and the two-factor
model remains predominant in the field of legal psychology even today.
By the mid 1980s, however, organizational psychologists also took an interest in
justice research. Starting with Bies and Moag (1986), organizational justice researchers
theorized that justice evaluations are made up of three, not two, independent judgments.
Distributive justice remained in their theory, but Bies and Moag (1986; Bies, 2001)
argued that “procedural justice” was too broad a construct, and that common definitions
of “procedural justice” actually combined two separate justice judgments—procedural
and interactional justice. “Procedural justice” was defined as an evaluation of the process
itself, whereas “interactional justice” was an evaluation of the authority making the
decision. Procedural justice judgments emerged from people’s perceptions that the
process was accurate and neutral, whereas interactional justice judgments came from
people’s perceptions that the authority was trustworthy, respectful, and explained the
reason for the decision. This three-factor model of procedural justice is still predominant
in the organizational justice field today; however, recently, Colquitt (2001) has proposed
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that interactional justice is also too broad a construct. Instead, he proposed that
“interactional justice” is better conceived as two constructs—interpersonal and
informational justice. Interpersonal justice refers to the authority’s treatment of the
decision recipient, while informational justice refers to the evaluations of the authority’s
willingness to provide an explanation about the decision that they made, as well as
evaluations of the quality of that explanation.
In this dissertation, I tested each of these measurement models—a single factor,
two factors, three factors, and four factors. Measurement of the first three models was
experimentally-derived, meaning that I manipulated each of the three constructs central to
those three models. Differences in severity of neglect served as manipulations of
distributive justice. Participants perceived the outcome of maintaining the child’s
placement outside the home as less fair when the mother had engaged in a moderate level
of child neglect as opposed to a severe level. Varying whether the jurisdiction allowed
parents to speak during the protective custody hearing was the direct manipulation of
procedural justice and varying the judge’s attitude toward the mother and varying
whether he provided her any information about the decision-making process and decision
served as the manipulation of interactional justice. This last manipulation included the
components of interpersonal and informational justice, which researchers have recently
added to the mix of justice factors. I did not independently manipulate these two factors,
but instead measured participants’ evaluations of both and found that they varied
considerably, which allowed me to also test the four-factor model of justice.
I used confirmatory factor analyses to test each of the four models, and only the
four-factor model of justice had adequate model fit. Thus, the four-factor organizational
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model of justice (OMJ) provided the best structural description of people’s evaluations of
justice in this study. In other words, people were clearly distinguishing between
distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice. The implication from
this finding is that the two- and three-factor models of procedural justice, which are
predominant today, may not be accurately describing how people really evaluate justice
in a given context. In fact, these models are likely clumping evaluations of the procedure,
interpersonal treatment, and informational treatment together, which clouds the
differential effects that each of these justice judgments might have.
The question of differential effects is a necessary step to validating the four-factor
model, because the OMJ makes explicit predictions that each justice judgment is
uniquely linked to specific justice outcomes. The question of differential effects was also
tested and will be discussed in the next section, but before moving on I must
acknowledge an alternative interpretation of the results of the confirmatory factor
analyses. It is possible that the general support for the four-factor model is an artifact of
the measurement technique used in this study.
I adopted Colquitt’s (2001) measure of justice judgments in this dissertation. The
advantages of adopting this measure were that the measure has been tested and validated,
it is widely used in the field, and Colquitt used it in his own test of the four-factor model.
In terms of measurement, there was an important disadvantage. The measure includes
four distinct sections, each of which measures one of the four types of justice (see
Appendix F). There are no construct labels for the items and no indication of their
construct membership in the instrument. However, the items within each factor appeared
next to each other in the survey. The result might be that participants merely answered
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each cluster of questions similarly because of their placement in the instrument, thus
causing greater support for the four-factor model over the other measurement models. As
I mentioned, Colquitt (2001) also used this approach, and his study has been the only one
to thoroughly test the four-factor model. In future tests of the OMJ, researchers should
take great care to use alternative measures and alternative arrangements of this measure
to provide stronger support for the model.
RQ 2: Do justice judgments differentially predict justice outcomes?As mentioned
above, a requisite step to validating the OMJ is establishing that the factors are
differentially related to their predicted outcomes. In the OMJ, Colquitt (2001) argued that
distributive justice should be more strongly related to evaluations of the favorability of
the decision, procedural justice should be more strongly related to evaluations of the
institutional and support for the institution. In this study, the operational definition of
organizational support involved legal compliance, or participants’ predictions of the
likelihood that the mother would ultimately comply with the judge’s orders and case plan.
Colquitt (2001) further argued that interpersonal justice should predict evaluations of the
authority making the decision. Finally, informational justice should more strongly predict
evaluations about the quality of the relationship between the decision-recipient and the
decision-maker or deciding organization. In this study, as in Colquitt (2001), relationship
quality was measured in terms of collective esteem, or the participants’ judgments that
the mother is a respected member of society.
Colquitt (2001) tested a model in which each justice judgment had a single path to
its outcome. I tested this single path model and found little support; the model fit
statistics were inadequate, so I did not interpret the parameters. In contrast to Colquitt’s
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(2001) single path model, I proposed that each of the justice judgments would predict
multiple outcomes, but that each justice judgment would more strongly relate to its
associated outcome. In other words, I expected that the core relationships proposed by the
OMJ would be there, but that a model with more paths would better fit the data. The
primary reason for this argument was the knowledge that justice judgments, while they
may operate independently, are still somewhat related, and as such, they should still be
somewhat related to multiple justice outcomes. If nothing else, 30 years of justice
research has established that the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes is
complicated.
The full path model performed well in that the model fit statistics were all in the
adequate to good range. However, I found only partial support for the specific
relationships hypothesized by the OMJ. I will discuss each justice outcome in turn,
starting with those hypotheses that that results supported. I found full support for the
OMJ’s predictions regarding distributive justice: distributive justice predicted decision
satisfaction more strongly than did any other justice judgment. In fact, this relationship
had the strongest standardized weight in the entire model. That this finding was the
strongest should not be surprising, as it is among the most robust in the justice literature.
A number of researchers (Roch & Shanock, 2006; Sweeney & McFarlin, 1993) have
replicated the connection between outcome fairness and personal evaluations of the
outcome.
In fact, this relationship between distributive justice and acceptance or satisfaction
with the outcome is at the core of the procedural justice research movement of the 1970s
and 1980s. It was Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) argument that perceptions of the
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procedure might also affect participants’ reactions to outcomes that sparked the field of
justice research as we know it today. Further, Tyler and colleagues (Tyler, 1989, 1994,
2006; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw,
1985) have argued and found that, in many circumstances, procedural justice can be an
even stronger predictor of decision satisfaction than is distributive justice. This study did
not support Tyler’s contention. Although procedural justice was a significant predictor of
decision satisfaction, it was weaker than distributive justice was. Perhaps more
importantly, the current definition of procedural justice was narrower in this portion of
the study, so that it did not map well onto Tyler’s definition. In fact, Tyler’s definition of
procedural justice includes components of interpersonal and informational justice, neither
of which significantly predicted decision satisfaction here.
I also found full support for the hypothesis that interpersonal justice judgments
would more strongly predict leader evaluation than would any of the other justice
judgments. The argument for the link between interpersonal justice and leader evaluation
is straightforward. Because interpersonal justice judgments result from people’s
perceptions of how respectfully they are treated by the decision-maker, it is these
judgments that most strongly influence their evaluations of that decision-maker. While
each of the other justice judgments was significantly predictive of leader evaluation, the
standardized weight for interpersonal justice was highest. This finding provides support
for the hypothesis that interpersonal justice is a separate construct, and that it is
independent from informational justice. The fact that informational justice had the
weakest loading onto leader evaluation also supports the contention that the two are
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separate justice judgments. However, it should be noted that these two latent constructs
were highly correlated, which means that they are, at least, interrelated.
I found partial support for the hypothesis that procedural justice would more
strongly predict legal compliance. The argument for this link is that procedural justice
refers to people’s evaluations of the process used to make a decision—whether that
process adheres to criteria associated with neutral, unbiased decision-making. As such,
evaluations of procedural justice reflect on the organization or institution that created
those procedures and link to outcomes relevant to evaluations of the organization or
institution. In the organizational justice context, outcomes associated with procedural
justice are usually discussed in terms of organizational support or citizenship (e.g.,
Ambrose & Schminke, 2003; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Roch & Shanock,
2006). Colquitt (2001) defined the outcome in terms of compliance with the rules of the
institution. The best analog in the child protection context was compliance with the
orders of the court and the case plan.
Consistent with the OMJ, procedural justice significantly predicted legal
compliance, but it was not the strongest predictor. Instead, distributive justice was the
strongest predictor of legal compliance. Importantly, distributive justice negatively
predicted legal compliance. In other words, as participants’ ratings of fairness increased,
their predictions that the mother would comply with the law decreased. This finding is
contrary to justice theories, the general tenet of which is that higher perceptions of justice
will lead to more positive outcomes.
This somewhat surprising finding likely reflects the context of the decision.
Participants were reading about a case of child neglect and evaluating whether they
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believed the mother would comply with her case plan. The distributive justice
manipulation in this study was a manipulation of the mother’s behavior that led to her
losing, at least temporarily, custody of her child. In the moderate neglect condition, the
primary allegation was that the child was home alone for a few hours in the evening
because the mother had to work late. In the severe neglect condition, the child was also
home alone, but the primary allegations described a dirty, unsafe home. It could be that in
evaluating these two scenarios, participants were also making inferences about the
mother’s motivation and/or ability to care for her child. It could be that participants in the
severe neglect condition, which was perceived as distributively more fair, believed that
the mother would be less capable or willing to comply with the law. Whereas participants
in the moderate neglect condition, which participants rated as distributively less fair,
believed that the mother would be more capable or willing to comply with the law.
I did not measure participants’ attributions of blame toward the mother, so this
hypothesis remains untested. However, it is an important one for future research.
Judgments about personal responsibility are central to legal decision-making. If it is true
that these kinds of judgments moderate some of the relationships between justice
judgments and outcomes, then it may be that the OMJ will not neatly translate into a legal
psychology context. It might also be that blame mediates the relationships between
justice judgments and outcomes in the OMJ. Future justice research should explore the
role of blame, especially in the legal context.
The final hypothesis of the OMJ, that informational justice would more strongly
predict collective esteem, received no supported at all in this study. The argument for this
hypothesis was that provision of adequate information communicates to decision-
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recipients something about their position in the group. This hypothesis is related to the
social identity arguments posed by Tyler (1989) in the group value model and Tyler and
Blader (2003) in the group engagement model. All of these models argued that people
look to how decision makers treat them to learn something about their social identity.
In this study, informational justice did not predict collective esteem at all. Instead,
interpersonal justice and distributive justice predicted collective esteem, with distributive
justice having the considerably stronger standardized weight. Again, distributive justice
negatively predicted collective esteem, meaning that increased perceptions of outcome
fairness predicted decreased perceptions that the mother is a respected member of
society. And again, this finding might reflect attributional judgments on the part of
participants. Participants might have themselves judged the mother as more blameworthy,
and therefore less respectable, in the severe neglect condition. In turn, the neglect
manipulation served to alter perceptions of distributive justice. In future research, it will
be important to disentangle the effects of distributive justice from the effects of
attributions of blame. In a similar vein, studies in which the participants are also the
decision recipients, rather than reading about decision recipients, will also help to
disentangle these effects.
RQ3: How well does the group engagement model account for justice outcomes?
The group engagement model was proposed by Tyler and Blader (2003). The authors
theorized that procedural justice has its effect on justice outcomes, in particular, group
engagement, indirectly via social identity judgments. Labeled the “social identity
mediation hypothesis” (Blader & Tyler, 2009), the authors argued that the value of
procedural justice is that it communicates to decision-recipients that they are valued
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members of the group. In other words, fair procedural treatment tells people that they
have a positive social identity. This positive social identity, in turn, directly motivates
people to engage in both mandatory and voluntary group behaviors.
Beyond this core argument, the authors of the group engagement model also made
some secondary hypotheses. First, they argued that procedural justice, which they defined
broadly to include aspects of procedural, interpersonal, and informational justice as
defined in the OMJ, would have stronger effects on social identity, but that resource
judgments would also have an influence on social identity. They defined resource
judgments as a combination of perceptions of the outcome fairness and outcome
favorability. The authors used the phrase “resource judgments,” because these
evaluations reflect general impressions about the amount of social resources and aid the
group is willing to give the decision-recipient. The group engagement model argues that
decision-recipients use their perceptions of resource availability and procedural justice to
evaluate their own social identity, but that the procedural justice judgments should exert a
stronger effect.
Using structural equation modeling, I found little support for the group
engagement model in this study. First, social identity did not mediate the relationships
between justice judgments and predictions about the mother’s likelihood of legal
compliance. In fact, procedural justice did not even directly predict legal compliance in
this model. Therefore, these data did not support the core proposition of the group
engagement model; however, the data did support the secondary proposition, that social
identity would mediate resource judgments. Resource judgments directly predicted social
identity, which significantly predicted legal compliance. In addition, as predicted with
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regard to mandatory behaviors, resource judgments also directly predicted legal
compliance.
Taken together, the results of this analysis suggested that resource judgments
were stronger predictors of legal compliance than perceptions of any of the other justice
judgments. This was consistent with the findings from the test of the OMJ, which showed
that distributive justice had a stronger relationship with legal compliance than did the
other three types of justice, with one important difference. In the test of the OMJ,
distributive justice had a negative relationship with legal compliance. In this study,
resource judgments linked positively to legal compliance. This finding is more consistent
with justice research. Note, however, that resource judgments did negatively predict
social identity. In other words, more positive resource judgments predicted less positive
evaluations of the mother’s social identity; when the mother received a fairer and more
favorable outcome, participants perceived her as less deserving of social respect and
personal pride. This is contrary to what one would expect, but might be an artifact of the
distributive justice manipulation. In this study, fairer outcomes were the result of the
mother committing more severe acts of neglect, which would reasonably lead to
participants rating the mother less favorably.
This study marks one of the first complete tests of the group engagement and the
very first test of the model in a legal context. Blader and Tyler (2009) recently published
a test of the social identity mediation hypothesis in the organizational justice context and
found support for the hypothesis. In this study, however, the results do not support the
model. While the authors proposed the model as a general theory of justice, it could be
that the model does not translate well into the legal context, or at least not the child
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protection context. Where parental rights and child custody are concerned, people may be
less concerned about procedural and interactional justice than they are about the
outcomes themselves. The results of this study suggest that resource judgments are far
more influential on predictions about legal compliance.
Another possibility is that the vignette design was not successful in creating the
conditions for social identification. The GEM model argues that people learn something
about their own social identities by being involved in an institutional decision-making
process. It is possible that participants’ investment in the process or this case was not
great enough to implicate their own social identities.
RQ 4: Does the neglect severity moderate the relationships between justice judgments
and outcomes?
Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) identified an interaction effect between justice
judgments. Specifically, they noted that perceptions of procedural and interactional
justice often interact with perceptions of distributive justice to affect the relationships
between justice judgments and outcomes. Specifically, they reviewed the literature and
observed that the relationship between procedural justice judgments and outcomes was
generally strongest when distributive justice was low.
I tested for this interaction effect in two ways. First, I tested for an interaction
effect within the factorial design of the study. The severity of neglect manipulation, by
design, also manipulated participants’ judgments of distributive justice. Those in the
moderate neglect condition perceived the outcome—keeping the child out of her home—
as less fair than those in the severe neglect condition. In a MANCOVA analysis, I tested
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for interactions between the three justice judgments. I found no evidence of an interaction
effect with the severity of neglect manipulation
Second, I tested for an interaction effect in a series of regression analyses, where I
added interaction terms in the second step to test whether interactions uniquely
contributed to prediction of justice outcomes. There was no evidence of an interaction
effect for two of the three justice outcomes. There was some evidence of an interaction
effect for collective esteem, but it was in the opposite direction predicted; the relationship
between interpersonal justice and collective esteem was stronger when distributive justice
was high, rather than when it was low. Taken together, these findings suggest that the
interaction effect is not as robust as Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996) argued. It could be
that distributive justice was too strongly related to outcomes, or procedural and
interactional justice were too weakly related too outcomes, for the interaction effect to
manifest.
RQ 5: Does participant role—decision-maker (i.e., judge) versus decisionrecipient (i.e, parent) moderate the relationships between justice judgments and
outcomes? The final research question was whether the nature of a participant’s role in
the legal process moderated the relationships between justice judgments and outcomes.
Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) found that decision-makers’ evaluations of procedural
justice and the decisions themselves were more strongly influenced by their judgments
about the relative costs and benefits associated with the case than by the traditional
procedural criteria. Even before conducting the primary analyses associated with this
research question, I found some support for this hypothesis. In my test of the OMJ and
the GEM, I ran the final models separately for assigned parents and assigned judges. For
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both models, I was unable to get convergence for assigned judges, meaning that the
models were not able to account adequately for the assigned judges’ responses.
For the primary tests of this research question, I assigned participants to either a
judge role (i.e., decision-maker) or a parent role (i.e., decision-recipient). In addition to
justice judgments, I also asked them to rate the costs and benefits of child protection
systems in general, including their tolerance for infringement of parents’ rights, perceived
magnitude of the threat of child neglect to society, perceived efficacy of the child
protection system in protecting children from harm, and the fairness of removing children
from their homes. I found only weak support for the argument that decision-makers and
decision-recipients evaluate decision satisfaction differently. For both assigned parents
and assigned judges perceptions of distributive justice and the fairness of child removal
influenced decision satisfaction. However, procedural justice influenced assigned parents
but not assigned judges. This finding supports the argument that traditional procedural
criteria more strongly influence decision-recipients.
I found stronger support when measuring decision-makers and decision-recipients
judgments about procedural and interactional justice. For procedural justice judgments,
distributive justice evaluations more strongly influenced judges, although parents’
distributive justice judgments were also significant predictors. For interactional justice
judgments, there was a significant role by distributive justice interaction; assigned
judges’ distributive justice judgments were significant predictors, but they were not
significant predictors for assigned parents.
In sum, the results of these analyses suggest that perceptions of distributive justice
are more influential on decision-makers’ procedural and interactional justice judgments
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than they are for decision-recipients. This pattern of results is consistent with Heuer,
Penrod, and Kattan (2007); however, it is important to note that my measure of societal
costs and benefits, which was based on those authors’ own measures, did not do a good
job of accounting for decision-makers’ judgments. The four scales were only sporadically
related to justice judgments and only more related for assigned judges than assigned
parents in one case. Perceived efficacy of the child protection system was a significant
predictor of assigned judges’, but not assigned parents’, procedural justice judgments. It
could be that perceived costs and benefits is not actually the best mechanism to explain
decision-makers judgments. It may be more straightforward. Decision-makers might
simply rely more strongly on distributive justice in evaluating outcomes, whereas
decision-recipients rely more strongly on procedural and interactional justice. Before
Thibaut and Walker’s (1975) justice research focused on distributive justice and its
associated outcomes. While the field has moved far from that in the past thirty years, it
may be time to revisit the idea that distributive justice judgments can be a powerful force,
especially where decision-makers are concerned.
A second possibility lies in the context. It is possible that the child protection
context makes societal costs and benefits less of a driving force in making justice
judgments, but this seems unlikely. Issues related to child maltreatment and the child
protection system are inherently issues of societal costs and benefits. The questions of
whether the state should remove children from their homes and for how long require a
weighing of the costs and benefits to children and to society. If anything, one might
expect the societal costs and benefits measures to be highly influential on both decisionmakers and decision-recipients, but that was not the case in this study.
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Taken together, these finding suggest that traditional models of procedural justice
must be explicitly qualified as only accounting for decision-recipients’ justice judgments
and outcomes. This kind of qualification may already be implicit in the models. For
example, some of the outcomes traditionally measured, like legal compliance, only make
sense from the perspective of decision-recipients. However, what outcomes should we
expect to be associated with decision-makers’ judgments about fairness? For decision
recipients, the research has robustly established some positive outcomes associated with
perceiving fair treatment during the decision-making process. For decision-makers,
Heuer, Penrod, and Kattan (2007) would perhaps argue that positive outcomes would be
more strongly associated when a decision is born from a positive societal cost-benefit
balance. However, I did not find that in this study. Decision satisfaction related only
weakly to societal costs and benefits, and it was equally related for both assigned judges
and assigned parents. Given that this is a new area of research, these results pose more
questions than they answer.
Implications for Procedural Justice Theory
In addition to the specific research questions discussed above, the results of this
dissertation have several general implications for procedural justice theory. Perhaps the
broadest conclusion is that the field would benefit from a clarification of the research
questions and conceptual definitions at use, especially in the legal psychology field. In
organizational psychology, scholars have recently attempted to synthesize the research
and bring coherence to the field. Perhaps most notably, Colquitt and Greenberg have
released two edited books in the past ten years (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg
& Colquitt, 2005). In addition, several scholars have published conceptual reviews of the

115
literature (Ambrose, 2002; Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Fortin, 2006;
Nowakowski & Conlon, 2005).
The reviews of the organizational justice literature offer some wisdom for justice
researchers in the legal context. First, as Ambrose (2002) noted in the organizational
context, legal psychologists must recognize that we are asking two distinct research
questions and we should treat them as such, without ignoring their interdependence. The
first question is what factors influence justice judgments. In other words, we must
identify a measurement model of justice that works in the legal context. The results of
this dissertation suggest that the organizational model of justice will translate nicely, but
we have to do more research focused specifically on answering the measurement question
in order to confidently draw that conclusion. While the measurement question was taken
up in early legal psychology justice research (e.g., Leventhal, 1980; Tyler, 1988, 1989), it
is rarely explicitly done so today. The one exception is the four-component model
introduced by Blader and Tyler (2003), which the authors argued was appropriate for
both organizational and legal contexts. However, that model was only tested in the
organizational context, and the authors themselves have not adopted that measurement
model in their subsequent research (Blader, 2007a; Blader & Tyler, 2009, Davis-Lipman,
Tyler, & Andersen, 2007; Tyler & De Cremer, 2005).
On the topic of measurement, distributive justice played a strong role in
participants’ evaluations of the decision in this child neglect case. Distributive justice
judgments most consistently and most strongly predicted the justice outcomes in this
design. Historically, justice researchers have played down the importance of distributive
justice, arguing that procedural justice is a far more potent influence on outcomes related
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to the decision (Bettencourt, Brown, & MacKenzie, 2005; Tyler, 1984, 2006; Tyler &
Blader, 2000; Tyler, Casper, & Fisher, 1989; Tyler, Rasinski, & McGraw, 1985). The
results here suggest that distributive justice does play a prominent role in people’s
understanding of justice and related outcomes. The advantage of the OMJ, especially as
compared to the GEM, is that it places distributive justice on equal status with other
justice judgments; thus, it recognizes that a complete understanding of justice requires
acknowledging the role of distributive justice.
The second issue that legal researchers need to address is identifying the specific
outcomes of justice judgments. Here, the legal psychology field, again, lags behind
organizational justice. In fact, Nowakowski and Conlon (2005) observe that the
organizational justice field has begun moving beyond this simple question to exploring
moderator effects. Researchers in legal psychology have not made a full move to
studying moderator effects, because the field is not in a position to do so yet. Although
legal psychologists have been studying justice concepts for just as long as organizational
researchers, they have not come as far in establishing the foundational connection
between justice judgments and behavioral outcomes. Most of the legal psychological
research stops short of measuring behavioral outcomes in favor of measuring short-term
satisfaction with the decision, stated intentions to comply with the law, and sometimes
respect for the law (e..g, Gover, Brank, & MacDonald, 2007; Maeder & Wiener, 2008;
Wells, 2007), although there are some important exceptions (Reisig, Bratton, & Gertz,
2007; Reisig & Mesko, 2009; Tyler, Sherman, Strang, Barnes, & Woods, 2007).
While these are all important outcomes, and indeed, the ones I tested in this study,
the presumption of the field is that positive justice judgments will directly contribute to
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positive behavioral outcomes. For example, the group engagement model (Tyler &
Blader, 2003) explicitly states that people who perceive fair treatment will more willingly
engaged in voluntary and mandatory group behaviors. Unfortunately, the group
engagement model received little support in this sample, suggesting that social identity
may not be the best explanation for the relationship between justice judgments and
outcomes in all legal contexts. In fact, Tyler and colleagues (Blader & Tyler, 2003, 2009;
Tyler & Blader, 2003) have tested the group engagement model primarily in the
organizational context. While the authors argue this model applies in the legal context, no
other researchers outside the current study have tested it in that context. There are
certainly reasons to expect that there are differences between these two contexts that
would render the processes underlying procedural justice judgments very different. For
example, people are free to work for organizations, while parents are forced into the child
protection system.
Clearly, empirically testing behavioral outcomes of justice judgments is a far
more difficult proposition in legal settings than in organizational ones. In the work place,
employees are easy to identify and easier to maintain in the sample along multiple time
points. In contrast, the logistics of tracking parties to a legal decision for multiple time
points is cumbersome, but doing so will be valuable to the field. If we cannot establish
that perceptions of justice do have an impact on people’s behavioral engagement in the
law, then we have little reason to study perceptions of fairness in the legal context at all.
Legal Implications
The results of this dissertation have three broad implications for the law, both
generally and in the child protection context. First, due process did matter to participants.
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In this study, procedural treatment was a direct manipulation of a key due process
protection—voice, or opportunity to present one’s side of the story. Participants who read
the scenario in which the judge afforded the mother this right rated higher procedural
justice. In addition, higher procedural justice ratings predicted participants’ belief that the
mother was more likely to comply with the law, that the judge was better at his job, and
overall decision satisfaction. The fact that procedural justice had such a strong influence
on justice outcomes lends support to the argument that due process protections do
promote a general sense of fairness and increased acceptance of legal decisions.
At this juncture, it is worth reiterating that the OMJ model did a good job of
accounting for participants’ justice judgments. In other words, participants did distinguish
between formal procedural treatment and informal interactional treatment. From a legal
perspective, this finding suggests that, in the legal context, people understand these
different kinds of treatment as separate but related constructs. This is consistent with the
law in that the law provides a number of procedural protections, but does very little to
provide legal parties protection from interpersonal treatment. From a research
perspective, this finding supports the argument that the OMJ does translate well into a
legal context and has some benefits over models that combine and confound procedural
and interactional treatment.
Second, predictions of legal compliance came from both procedural and
distributive justice perceptions. That is to say that with a simultaneous test of all justice
judgments, only formal procedural treatment and distributive treatment predicted
participants’ ratings of the mother’s likelihood to comply with the case plan. This finding
is consistent with the organizational literature, which predicts that procedural treatment
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will be related to institutional support, including rule obedience (Colquitt, 2001;
Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Roch & Shanock, 2006). However, and importantly,
this finding is contrary to much of the rhetoric of procedural justice researchers in the
legal context, who arguably overemphasize the import of interactional treatment as a
powerful force in facilitating compliance with the law and minimize objective,
distributive justice (Gonzalez & Tyler, 2008; Tyler, 2006).
As Fox (1999) argued, it could be that this increased emphasis on interactional
justice in the law has distracted us from remembering that procedural and distributive
outcomes are the foundation on which a truly just legal system are built. Without due
process and generally fair outcomes, interactional justice means little and maybe nothing
at all. Along these lines, distributive justice judgments were a strong influence on
participants’ ratings of all justice-related outcomes. In fact, overall, distributive justice
was the most consistent predictor of justice outcomes. Thus, in the child protection
context, it appears that participants’ perceptions that the removal was fair were more
powerful than their judgments about how fairly the court treated the mother during the
hearing.
Again, the fact that participants were outcome-focused is contrary to what
procedural justice researchers generally find, but it is important to note that most
procedural justice researchers do not study the topic within a context with so much
consequence. In the child protection context, parents face the temporary loss of custody
of their children and the knowledge that this loss may become permanent. With an
outcome this severe at stake, it is easy to imagine that issues of distributive justice might
overshadow any concerns about procedural and, especially, interactional justice that
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might otherwise be present. This line of reasoning begs the question whether there is a
point at which the outcome at stake is so personally important that concern over it
dominates the other justice evaluations that are typically involved during a decisionmaking procedure? If there is, then one can easily imagine that point to be present quite
often in the legal context, suggesting that procedural and interactional justice might not
play as strong a role across the legal board as justice researchers have argued. In order to
understand truly the boundaries between procedural, interactional, and distributive
justice, legal psychologists must begin to test the theory in the field.
Third, parents and judges are likely to perceive and evaluate the legal process
quite differently. In this study, assigned judges placed a bigger premium on distributive
justice than assigned parents, especially when evaluating the procedural and interactional
justice in the scenario. In other words, assigned judges’ perceptions of distributive justice
impacted their evaluations of procedural and interactional justice, suggesting that
distributive justice judgments had some sort of primacy over the other justice judgments.
On the other hand, distributive justice influenced parents less when they made their other
justice evaluations, although (as noted in the prior paragraph), assigned parents were still
quite influenced by distributive justice in general.
The fact that parents and judges are likely to perceive the process differently has
important implications for the practice of the law. If judges are not as attuned to issues
related to procedural and interpersonal treatment, then they will be less likely to modify
their behavior to promote procedural and interactional justice. Procedural justice, to a
great extent, is commanded by due process laws; however, interactional treatment is at
the discretion of individual judges. The child protection context, which is often
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characterized by more informal hearings, is one in which judges could have great
freedom to practice communication techniques that parents’ might perceive as more just,
including speaking in plain English, clearly explaining decisions, and always being
respectful toward parents.
The results of this study suggested that when people perceive the interactional
treatment as more positive, they are more likely to evaluate the judge as competent and
they are more likely to respects the law. These outcomes might have important effects on
parents’ engagement in the legal process. In fact, it is possible that respect for the judge
and a sense of personal respect might be better indicators of parents’ progress toward
reunification than complying with the case plan. As Brank et al. (2001) noted,
compliance with a case plan is only a good indicator that the parent will be able to
maintain the child’s safety and wellbeing when the case plan is narrowly tailored to the
parents’ needs. In reality, many case plans are written broadly and compliance is
measured in terms of attendance at meetings rather than improvement in skills or
reduction of problem behaviors. In the future, researchers should identify specific
indicators of improved parenting and establish that justice judgments conform to those
indicators.
Limitations and Future Research
I identified many of the limitations of this study earlier in this discussion, so I will
only briefly address them here. Perhaps the biggest weakness was that this was a
laboratory study, meaning that the design was artificial and weak in external validity.
Participants read a written case file and description of what happened in a fictional court
proceeding. People attending actual court hearings would likely react to the situation
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differently, probably more strongly than participants in this study. Beyond the difference
between the written word and actual presence in a hearing, there is also the difference
between what was at stake for participants in this study and what is truly at stake for
participants in a child protection hearing. Judges are burdened with the responsibility of
making decisions that greatly impact the lives of children and families, including keeping
children outside the custody of their parents. Real judges, as opposed to participants
assigned as judges, would have the benefit of their own experience, as well as the
pressures of a real docket. Parents face the possibility of long-term separation from their
children, let alone the barriers of low socioeconomic status, mental health, and substance
abuse problems, which are common among parents in the child protection system
(Forrester & Harwin, 2006; Sidebotham & Heron, 2006; Stromwall, Larson, Nieri,
Holley, Topping, Castillo et al., 2008). Real parents, as opposed to participants assigned
as parents, would potentially be much more affected by and much more aware of
variations in procedural and interpersonal treatment.
In terms of internal validity, the procedural justice manipulation was somewhat
weak compared to the other manipulations. In this study, the manipulation of procedural
treatment either allowed or refused the mother an opportunity to present her side of the
story in court. The vignette made it clear that the judge had no discretion in granting or
denying the mother’s request to speak, and it is true that the majority of participants did
understand that. Nonetheless, compared to the other manipulations, a large minority did
not correctly understand the parameters of the procedural treatment manipulation. The
weakness of the manipulation could explain why procedural justice was less strongly
related to outcomes than expected. However, it is important to consider the legal context.
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While some participants did not understand this manipulation, the question remains
whether parents in a real child protection proceeding are able to make that distinction.
Unlike in the organizational context, the distinction between institutional treatment and
interpersonal treatment blur easily because the public has less familiarity with rules of
law than with the norms in the workplace. Future research should explore whether
understanding of the law affects people’s evaluations of procedural and interpersonal
treatment.
The procedural justice manipulation was also somewhat artificial in that, by law,
parents’ have the constitutional right to testify in their defense, at least the time of
adjudication (Jones, 2006). Nonetheless, by beginning this line of research with a basic
due process right, I was able to confirm that the refusal of due process rights, in fact, does
reduce procedural justice judgments. In the future, researchers should begin to explore
the boundaries of due process-what rights are most important to parents involved in the
child protection system?
The interactional treatment manipulation was quite effective in altering
perceptions of interactional justice, but there is one weakness in the design. I manipulated
interpersonal and informational treatment concurrently, rather than orthogonally, thus
weakening conclusions based on the distinction between interpersonal and informational
justice from this sample. Even so, participants’ ratings of interpersonal and informational
justice were sufficiently distinct to be able to test the constructs separately in the
analyses. In the future, I would like to begin exploring the differential effects of
interpersonal and informational justice in the child protection context with stronger
research design. Field research suggests that both interpersonal and informational
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treatment are relevant to parents’ reactions to the child protection system, but that
information might be more important (Drake, 1994; Dumbrill, 2006; Kapp & Propp.
2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings, 1995).
In all, the dependent measures were coherent and proved reliable. I adopted them
almost entirely from prior research, largely from Colquitt (2001). Because they were
adapted from Colquitt’s work, this study provides a solid replication of many of his core
hypotheses. Nevertheless, researchers will need to test the relationships with alternative
measures of justice judgments and outcomes to be fully confident in this model. Testing
different outcomes is especially important. Here, I tested participants’ perceptions of the
mother in the scenario. Future research should extend this by testing outcomes that are
more personally relevant to the evaluator. Future research should also test behavioral, not
just attitudinal, outcomes. Finally, in the future, researchers should test additional
outcomes, which they can theoretically derive from the model. For example, if procedural
treatment is perceived as institutionally linked, and therefore affects institutionally
relevant outcomes, then increased respect for the institution should be an outcome of
positive procedural treatment. Tyler (2006) has shown a link between procedural justice
and perceived legitimacy of authority and respect for the law, but all of his work uses a
much broader definition of procedural justice, one that includes an interactional
component. To my knowledge, Tyler has not evaluated whether this more narrow
definition of procedural treatment also predicts respect for the law.
Ultimately, this study was a potential first in a program of research that explores
the utility of the organizational model of justice in the legal context, in particular, the role
that justice judgments play in influencing parental compliance with case plans. As that, it
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served its purpose. The results generally supported the organizational model of justice in
both its measurement and its structure, although not as strongly in its structure. Future
research needs to replicate and extend these findings in the child protection context, in
addition to other legal contexts. It will be important to enter the courtroom and beginning
talking to parties to child protection cases. In terms of procedural and interactional
treatment, future studies should combine courtroom observations with interviews of
parents to get a more complete sense of differences between objective and perceived
treatment, and how treatment impacts parents’ willingness to engage in the process.
In addition, it will be important to explore other legal factors. Parents interact
with their caseworkers and their attorneys more often than with judges, and their
caseworkers are in a position of authority. It is likely that parents’ interactions with their
caseworkers also involve elements of fair or unfair treatment, and that this treatment is
even more powerful on parents’ future behavior in the case. In fact, many researchers
have identified the quality of the caseworker-parent relationship as an important
influence on parents’ willingness to cooperate with child protective services (Drake,
1994; Dumbrill, 1996; Kapp & Propp, 2002; Thoburn, Lewis, & Shemmings, 1995).
Importing a procedural justice framework to this body of research might go a long way in
helping to introduce some coherence to this literature, as well as identify potential
gateways and barriers to parental compliance.
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Appendix A. Role Induction Materials
Judge Induction
This study is about a juvenile court case. In juvenile court, judges have to hear a variety
of cases, including cases involving child abuse and neglect. When a parent has been
accused of abusing or neglecting their child, it is the judge’s job to make a range of
decisions. For example, juvenile court judges have to hear descriptions of the child’s
living circumstances and decide whether it was reasonable that the caseworker removed
the child from home. Judges also have to decide when and whether it is safe for the child
to return home and, in severe cases, whether a parent’s right to their child should be
terminated altogether. In general, juvenile court judges have to make decisions about
what is in the child’s best interests.
Imagine that you are a judge in a juvenile court, where you frequently hear and decide
child abuse cases. Please take the next few minutes to imagine what it would be like to be
a juvenile court judge, and then answer the following questions.
Would it be easy or difficult for you to be a juvenile court judge? Please write a
paragraph explaining your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
What kinds of information would you need to make good decisions? Please write a
paragraph explaining your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
How would it feel to be a juvenile court judge hearing child abuse and neglect cases?
Please write a paragraph explaining your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Next, you will read a court case file describing a child neglect case based upon one that
recently came before a juvenile court. The identifying information has been changed, but
the core facts are similar to those in the original case.
Please read the file carefully, thinking about it from the perspective of a
juvenile court judge, then answer a series of questions about the case.
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Parent Induction
Imagine that you are a single parent of a 10-year-old daughter. As a single parent, you
have to take care of your child. For example, you have to make sure that your child has
food to eat, clothes to wear, and a safe place to live. In general, you have to do your best
to make sure that your child’s needs and interests are met. Please take the next few
minutes to imagine what it would be like to be accused of neglecting your child, and have
your child removed from your home. Within two days of your child’s removal, you must
attend a hearing before a judge, who is to decide whether the child should temporarily
remain outside of your home.
What would it be like to a parent in this situation? Please write a paragraph explaining
your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
How would you feel about attending this hearing? Please write a paragraph explaining
your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
What would you expect to happen at this hearing? Please write a paragraph explaining
your answer.
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

Next, you will read a court case file describing a child neglect case based upon one that
recently came before a juvenile court. I have changed the identifying information, but the
core facts are similar to those in the original case.
Please read the file carefully, thinking about it from the perspective of a parent,
and then answer a series of questions about the case.
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Appendix B. Official Juvenile Petition
Severe Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the petition, followed by the petition’s text. Within the
petition, only the italicized text was manipulated for this study. Participants did not see the italics.

OFFICIAL JUVE ILE PETITIO
The county attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe
the nature of the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and
bringing the case before the court.

IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT
IN THE INTEREST OF

)
)
HAILEY SMITH
)
)
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )

DOC. 9128 NO. 23

JUVENILE PETITION

COMES NOW, Sally Marlon, Deputy County Attorney and shows to the Court:
That said child is under the age of eighteen years, said child’s date of birth being
January 4, 1999.
COUNT I: That the above-named minor child is in a situation dangerous to life or
limb or injurious to the health or morals of said child in that:
A. On or about January 13, 2009, the child was removed from her home when it
was found in a dirty condition and she was found alone with no adult
supervision, to wit:
1. A toilet in one bathroom was broken and the child continued to use it. The
toilet was filled with feces and urine and feces were on the floor.
2. The house had clothes, food containers, and debris on the floor
everywhere. A strong smell of urine permeated the upstairs of the home.
3. Piles of rat feces were scattered through the dresser drawers and on the
floor of the home.
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that summons issue and be served upon the abovenamed child, the child’s mother, the person having custody and control of said child,
requiring them to appear personally before this Court at the time and place stated in said
summons and that the Court make such orders concerning the care, custody and control
of said child as deemed appropriate in the premises.
Sally Marlon, petitioner
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Moderate Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the petition, followed by the petition’s text. Within the
petition, only the italicized text was manipulated for this study. Participants did not see the italics.

OFFICIAL JUVE ILE PETITIO
The county attorney files the official petition. The purpose of the petition is to describe
the nature of the situation that led to removing Hailey from her mother’s home and
bringing the case before the court.

IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT
IN THE INTEREST OF

)
)
HAILEY SMITH
)
)
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )

DOC. 9128 NO. 23

JUVENILE PETITION

COMES NOW, Sally Marlon, Deputy County Attorney and shows to the Court:
That said child is under the age of eighteen years, said child’s date of birth being
January 4, 1999.
COUNT I: That the above-named minor child is in a situation dangerous to life or
limb or injurious to the health or morals of said child in that:
A. On or about January 13, 2009, the child was removed from her home when it
was found in a dirty condition and she was found alone with no adult
supervision, to wit:
1. The minor child was found sitting in her home watching television with no
adult supervision.
2. The minor child explained that her mother worked until 5pm, and that she
always arrived home from school at 4pm and watched television until her
mom came home.
3. The kitchen sink, table, and counters were full of dirty dishes and pans
and there was no clean food preparation area.
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that summons issue and be served upon the abovenamed child, the child’s mother, the person having custody and control of said child,
requiring them to appear personally before this Court at the time and place stated in said
summons and that the Court make such orders concerning the care, custody and control
of said child as deemed appropriate in the premises.
Sally Marlon, petitioner
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Appendix C. Official Caseworker Court Report
The caseworker files the court report before the protective custody hearing. The purpose
of the court report is for the caseworker to make recommendations to the judge about
what to order for the family.

Nebraska Health and Human Services System
COURT REPORT
Date of Preparation: 1-15-2009
FAMILY INFORMATION
Parent: Sarah Smith
Child:
Name: Hailey Smith
Birthdate: 1-4-1999

Age: 10 years

Case Manager: Becky Cassidy
COURT RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended the court order:

1. That Hailey remain in the temporary legal and physical custody of the
Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services.
2. That Ms. Smith, the mother, participate in a parenting assessment and
class.
3. That Ms. Smith, the mother, maintains a sanitary and safe home
environment for Hailey.
4. That Ms. Smith, the mother, ensures that Hailey is being properly
supervised at all times.
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Appendix D. Protective Custody Hearing Summary
Unfair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.
“First, the toilet in the home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.” The judge then rudely
added, “That is disgusting, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would keep your
home in such a filthy condition, especially with your daughter also living there.”
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“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash
scattered on the floor throughout the home.” The judge continued in a hostile tone, “I
just don’t understand how you could live like that.”
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope
you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. Smith!”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms.
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.”
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?”
“Good,” said the judge, smiling.
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations
in this petition.
“First, the toilet in your home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.”
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash
scattered on the floor throughout the home.”
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms.
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.”
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has
happened here today?”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.
“First, the toilet in the home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.” The judge then rudely
added, “That is disgusting, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would keep your
home in such a filthy condition, especially with your daughter also living there.”
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash
scattered on the floor throughout the home.” The judge continued in a hostile tone, “I
just don’t understand how you could live like that.”
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“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope
you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms. Smith!”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.”
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge.
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Severe Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?”
“Good,” said the judge, smiling
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations
in this petition.
“First, the toilet in your home was broken, but continued to be used. The toilet had urine
and feces in it, and there were feces on the floor of the bathroom.”
“Second, the house was messy and dirty. There were clothes, food containers, and trash
scattered on the floor throughout the home.”
“Third, there were piles of rat feces in your home.”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.”
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge.
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has
happened here today?”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” The judge then rudely
added, “That is unacceptable, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would leave
your daughter unsupervised.”
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.” The judge
continued in a hostile tone, “I just don’t understand how you do that.”
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“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and
table.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms.
Smith!”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms.
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.”
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Unfair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version
[OTE: Only italicized text has been manipulated; italics were not present for
participants.]

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?”
“Good,” said the judge, smiling.
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations
in this petition.
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.”
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.”
“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and
table.”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law prevents me from allowing Ms.
Smith to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective
custody hearing is merely to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are not
allowed to provide information at this hearing. Ms. Smith cannot speak to the court in the
manner you requested. I cannot hear her testimony now.”
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has
happened here today?”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Unfair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared irritated and gave Ms. Smith a disapproving look. Ms. Smith
heard the judge mumble, “This is disgusting.” After a moment, the judge looked at the
courtroom and said, “There are three allegations in this petition.
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.” The judge then rudely
added, “That is unacceptable, Ms. Smith. I am absolutely appalled that you would leave
your daughter unsupervised.”
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.” The judge
continued in a hostile tone, “I just don’t understand how you do that.”
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“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and
table.” At this, the judge got irate. “I hope you’re as disgusted with yourself as I am, Ms.
Smith!”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.”
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge.
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”
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Fair Procedural Treatment/Fair Interactional Treatment/Moderate Neglect Version
Below is the description of the purpose of the hearing summary, followed by the
summary’s text. Within the summary, only the italicized text was manipulated for this
study. Participants did not see the italics.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARI G SUMMARY
The protective custody hearing is the first hearing before the court after the child welfare
agency or the police have removed the child from the home. The primary purpose of the
hearing is for the judge to decide whether the removal was legally appropriate, and
whether the agency can safely return the child home while the case goes through the
court process.

PROTECTIVE CUSTODY HEARING SUMMARY
On January 20, 2009, Judge Jones held the protective custody hearing for Hailey Smith’s
case. Hailey’s mother, Sarah Smith, attended the hearing, along with her attorney. Also in
attendance was the county attorney who filed the original petition and the caseworker
responsible for removing Hailey from her mother’s home.
The judge called the hearing to order by banging his gavel, and announcing, “This is the
protective custody hearing in the matter of Hailey Smith. Please note for the record that
Hailey’s mother, Ms. Smith, is here with her attorney, and the county attorney and
caseworker in the case are also present. Let’s begin.”
The judge turned to the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, this is called the protective custody
hearing. I want to explain to you why we are here. As you know, Hailey was living with
you up until a few days ago, when the caseworker took her out of your custody. The
purpose of today’s hearing is for me to hear about why Hailey was removed and for me
to decide if Hailey should remain out of your home for now or if she is safe to be returned
to your care while the case continues. Do you understand?”
“Good,” said the judge, smiling
The judge addressed the courtroom, “The county attorney filed a petition in the matter of
Hailey Smith, describing the conditions at her home that led to Hailey’s removal. For the
record, I will review the allegations.” The judge took the petition, and skimmed it. While
reading, the judge appeared interested and occasionally glanced up at Ms. Smith. After a
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moment, the judge looked at the mother and said, “Ms. Smith, there are three allegations
in this petition.
“First, Hailey was found home alone without adult supervision.”
“Second, Hailey is left home alone for an hour each day five days a week.”
“Third, the kitchen was dirty, and dirty dishes were also on the kitchen counter and
table.”
After reading the petition, the judge asked the County Attorney and caseworker if they
had anything to add. They both declined.
The judge then asked Ms. Smith’s attorney if she had anything to say on behalf of her
client. The attorney said, “Yes, your honor. I have a request on behalf of my client. Your
honor, Ms. Smith is a single parent of a ten-year-old girl who is doing the best she can
with limited resources. If it pleases the court, Ms. Smith would like the opportunity to
explain the situation from her own perspective.”
The judge answered the attorney, “As you know, the law requires that I allow Ms. Smith
to speak in my courtroom at this stage of the case. The purpose of the protective custody
hearing is to decide on the child’s placement, and parents are allowed to provide
information at this hearing. Ms. Smith has a right to provide her own perspective, so that
I may consider it in deciding Hailey’s placement. I can hear her testimony now.”
The mother then described her side of the story to the judge.
After a moment, the judge addressed the entire court: “Do either of the parties have any
other matters?” Both lawyers shook their heads. “Very well, then it is the decision of this
court that the child remains in the temporary legal and physical custody of Health and
Human Services.”
The judge turned to Ms. Smith, and said rather gently, “Ms. Smith, this means that I have
ordered that Hailey live outside of your home for the time being. I have made this
decision based on what I believe to be in Hailey’s best interests. Based on what I have
read in this petition, I believe that you have not taken appropriate care of Hailey, and
that she is not safe in your home. Ms. Smith, do you have any questions about what has
happened here today?”
After a pause, the judge banged the gavel and announced, “This hearing is adjourned.”

155

Appendix E. Protective Custody Hearing Findings And Order
This document is the judge’s official order at the end of the protective custody hearing. It
formalizes the decision the judge made during the hearing, including whether the child should
remain out of her mother’s home or return home pending the next hearing.

IN THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURT
IN THE INTEREST OF

)
)
HAILEY SMITH
)
)
Child Under Eighteen Years of Age )

DOC. 9128 NO. 23

FINDINGS AND ORDER

Now on the 20th day of January, 2004, the above-captioned matter came on for Protective
Custody hearing before the undersigned Judge of the Separate Juvenile Court upon a Petition
filed herein January 15, 2009. Appearing were Sarah Smith, the child’s mother, with counsel,
Colleen Wilson; Becky Cassidy, Department of Health and Human Services; and Sally Marlon,
Deputy County Attorney.
Being fully advised in the premises, the Court finds:
That further detention of the above-named child is a matter of immediate and urgent
necessity for the protection of said child.
That continued placement in the residence is contrary to the child’s welfare because the
house was found in a dirty condition and the child was found alone without adult supervision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the child herein be and is hereby placed in the
temporary custody of the Department of Health and Human Services for placement, pending
further proceedings herein.
Signed and dates this 15th date of January, 2009.
BY THE COURT:
JUDGE JONES, Separate Juvenile Court
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Appendix F. Measures
Below are all measures that I asked participants to complete. Here, all items are grouped
according to construct with the construct clearly identified, but participants did not see
the construct labels.
Manipulation Checks
Directions: Below is a series of statements about the case file that you just read. Some
statements have number scales below them. For these statements, please circle the
number that best indicates how you feel about the case. The rest of the statements are
True/False. For these, please mark whether you think the statement is True or False.
Role induction
1. Before you read the case, I asked you to evaluate it from one of the following
perspectives. Please select the perspective you were assigned:
County Attorney
Parent’s Attorney
Judge
Parent
eglect severity
1. This was a serious case of neglect.
ot serious at all
1
2
3
4
5

6

very serious
7

2. Hailey was living in a harmful environment with her mother.
ot harmful at all
very harmful
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
3. Hailey was living in a dirty home.
ot dirty at all
1
2
3
4
5

6

very dirty
7

4. Hailey was home alone when she was removed and taken into custody.
True
False
Procedural Justice
1. The mother was given an opportunity to present her story at the hearing.
True
False
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2. The judge had no choice about whether to let the mother present her story at the
hearing.
True
False
Interactional Justice
1. The judge expressed disapproval of the mother.
o disapproval at all
A lot of disapproval
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
2. The judge explained his decision to the mother.
o explanation at all
A lot of explanation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Decision
1. The judge returned Hailey to her mother’s home at the end of the hearing.
True
False

Justice Perceptions
The next set of questions refers to your perceptions of the Protective Custody Hearing
procedures and outcome. Please read each question and indicate the extent to which the
content of each question happened or did not happen.
Procedural Justice
The following items refer to the process used during the hearing to arrive at the decision.
To what extent:
1. Was the mother able to express her views and feelings during the hearing
procedure?
2. Did the mother have influence over the decision being made during the hearing
procedure?
3. Was the hearing procedure free of bias?
4. Was the hearing procedure based on accurate information?
5. Did the hearing procedure uphold ethical and moral standards?
6. Was the process used to make the decision during the hearing fair? (global)
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Interactional Justice/Interpersonal
The following items refer to the judge at the hearing. To what extent:
1. Did the judge treat the mother in a polite manner?
2. Did the judge treat the mother with dignity?
3. Did the judge treat the mother with respect?
4. Did the judge refrain from improper remarks or comments?
Interactional Justice/Informational
The following items refer to the judge at the hearing. To what extent:
1. Was the judge candid in his communications with the mother?
2. Did the judge explain his decision thoroughly?
3. Did the judge explain the procedures thoroughly?
4. Were the judge’s explanations about the hearing procedures and decision
reasonable?
5. Did the judge treat the mother fairly during the hearing? (global interactional)
Distributive Justice
The following items refer to the outcome of the hearing. In other words, the following
items refer to the decision made at the end of hearing. To what extent:
1. Did the judge’s decision reflect what the mother deserved?
2. Was the judge’s decision appropriate given the situation?
3. Was the judge’s decision justified given what the mother had done?
4. Was the hearing outcome fair? (global)

Justice Outcomes
For the next set of statements, think about the outcome of this hearing and how you think
the case will ultimately end. Read each statement and indicate the extent to which you
disagree or agree.
Disagree completely
completely
1
2
3

Agree
4

5

6

Decision Satisfaction and Approval
How much do you agree with these items about the judge’s decision?
1. The judge’s decision was acceptable.
2. I am satisfied with the judge’s decision.

7
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3. The mother should be satisfied with the judge’s decision.
4. I agreed with the judge’s decision at the end of the hearing.
Leader Evaluation
How much do you agree with these items about the judge?
1. The judge was a good judge.
2. I really liked the judge.
3. The judge did a good job at this hearing.
4. I respect this judge.
Legal Compliance
How much do you agree with these statements about the future of the case?
1. The mother will try to follow the rules of her case plan.
2. The mother will attend her next hearing on time.
3. The mother will follow the orders the judge gave her.
4. In the end, the mother will be reunited with her daughter.
Collective Esteem
Same three items as Respect (below).

Identity Judgments
ow, think about the mother in this case. Read these questions and indicate how much
you disagree or agree with each statement.
Disagree completely
completely
1
2
3

Agree
4

5

6

7

Respect
How much do you agree with these items about the mother?
1. If most people knew the mother well, they would respect her values. (respect)
2. If most people knew the mother well, they would think highly of her
accomplishments. (respect)
3. If most people knew the mother well, they would approve of how she lives her
life. (respect)
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Pride
How much do you agree with these items about the mother?
1. The mother is proud to think of herself as a parent.
2. When someone praises parents as a group, the mother feels that praise is a
personal compliment to her.
3. The mother talks up being a parent to her friends.
Identity
How much do you agree with these items about the mother?
1. Being a parent says a lot about who the mother is as a person.
2. When something goes wrong as a parent, the mother feels a personal
responsibility to fix it.
3. Being a parent is important to the way the mother thinks of herself.
4. When someone from outside criticizes the mother’s problems as a parent, it feels
like a personal insult.
Societal Costs and Benefits
Disagree completely
completely
1
2
3

Agree
4

5

6

7

Respect for Parents’ Rights
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements?
1. In general, removal of children from their homes is an infringement on parents’
rights.
2. In this case, removing the child from her mother’s home was an infringement of
her mother’s rights.
3. In general, child protection court hearings infringe on parents’ rights.
4. In this case, the child protection court hearing infringed on the mother’s rights.
Magnitude of Threat
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements?
1. Child neglect is a big problem in our society.
2. In this case, I am worried about the mother’s behavior that led to the removal of
her child from her home.
3. I am worried about the extent of child neglect in our society.
4. Child neglect is a big risk to children’s safety and wellbeing.
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5. In this case, the mother’s behavior was a threat to Hailey’s safety and wellbeing.
6. In cases like this, our society should be worried about the children involved.
Efficacy of the Intervention
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements?
1. When child protective services intervenes, the risk of child neglect is effectively
reduced.
2. Child protective services is an effective intervention system.
3. Removing children from their homes is a good strategy to prevent the harms of
child neglect.
4. Court hearings are effective at reducing the risks and harms of child neglect.
5. Court hearings are effective at reducing the amount of child neglect in our society.
Attitudes about Fairness of Child Removal
How much do you disagree or agree with each of these statements?
1. In this case, the way that the child was removed from her home was fair.
2. In this case, removing the child from her home was a fair response to the
situation.
3. In general, we use fair procedures to remove children from their homes in this
society.
4. I approve of the procedures our society uses to remove children from their homes.
Demographics
These are the final questions. Please answer the following questions about yourlsef.
1. What is your age (in years)?
_________ years

2. Which gender do you identify with?
Male
Female
Transgender
Prefer not to say
3. Which racial group do you most identify with?
Non-Hispanic White/European-American
Black/African-American American
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Hispanic
Asian/Pacific-Islander
Prefer not to say
4. How liberal or conservative are you?
Very liberal
1
2

3

4

5

Very conservative
6
7

5. Do you have children:
Yes
No
If yes: These questions should only be answered if you have children. If you
do not have children this page and were sent to this page, just scroll to the
bottom and click “next.”
How many children do you have? _________________________
Please list the ages in years of each child. If you have more than five children,
enter the ages of your five youngest children. __________________________
Do you currently have full physical custody of all of your minor (non-adult)
children?
Yes
No
If no:
If you do not have full custody, how long (in years) has it been since you
did not have custody. If you have never had custody, enter “never.”
_______________________
If you do not have fully custody, who does?
Other parent
Other relative
Foster parent
Other: _____________________
If you do not have full custody, why not? Please explain briefly.
________________________________

